Copyright 1993, P. van Beukering, P. Vellinga. All rights reserved. For more information contact author TITEL VAN DE PUBLIKATIE (hoofdletters en vet) De eventuele ondertitel: kleine letters en vet)CLIMATE CHANGE, FROM SCIENCE TO GLOBAL POLITICS R-, E- of W-nummer:93/370 Namen van de auteurs: (niet vet)Drs. P. van Beukering Prof.dr. P. Vellinga BINNEN-TITEL-PAGINA TITEL VAN DE PUBLIKATIE (hoofdletters en vet) Eventuele ondertitel (kleine letters en vet)CLIMATE CHANGE, FROM SCIENCE TO GLOBAL POLITICS Namen van de auteurs (niet vet):Drs. P. van Beukering Prof.dr. P. Vellinga Blokje IVM (hoef je niets aan te doen)Instituut voor Milieuvraagstukken Institute for Environmental Studies Maand en jaar van de publikatieOctober 1993 CONTENTS Pag. 1. INTRODUCTION1 2. CLIMATE CHANGE - SCIENCE AND POLICY 3 2.1.Science3 2.1.1. Causes 3 2.1.2. Impacts 4 2.1.3. Uncertainty 6 2.2. Policy 7 2.2.1. Addressing the causes - limitation strategy 7 2.2.2. Addressing the impacts - adaptation strategy 10 2.2.3. Addressing the uncertainties - precautionary principle 11 3. CLIMATE CHANGE - GLOBAL ASPECTS 13 3.1. Historical Development 13 3.1.1. The Scientific track 13 3.1.2. The Political track 15 3.1.3. The UN-policy Development track 17 3.2. The United Nations Convention on Climate Change20 3.2.1. Description of the Convention 20 3.2.2. Implementation of the Convention 22 3.2.3. The Negotiation process 25 4. CLIMATE CHANGE - REGIONAL ASPECTS 27 4.1. The Developed Countries 28 4.1.1. The United States 28 4.1.2. The European Community 29 4.1.3. Japan 30 4.2. The Countries with Economies in Transition 32 4.2.1. Eastern Europe 32 4.2.2. Russia 33 4.3. The Developing Countries 35 4.3.1. India/China 35 4.3.2. Small Island States and other low-lying areas 37 4.3.3. The OPEC members 37 5. CONCLUSION 39 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS?? REFERENCES 41 1. INTRODUCTION Over the last few decades it has become evident that human activities are significantly altering the composition of the atmosphere and its radiative properties. As a result global environmental problems are being caused, such as climate change, ozone depletion and `global smog'[0], which potentially have far reaching effects on society. In this chapter we will focus on global climate change and the process which eventually led to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC). Before the FCCC was signed in June 1992 at the UNCED Conference in Rio, several scientific developments and political mechanisms could be observed; an evolutionary process which today is far from concluded. Scientific development is gradually improving the understanding of the impact on the atmospheric changes. At the same time, international consultation mechanisms arise which facilitate the development of a global climate policy. Climate change which involves the private sector, governments, non- governmental organizations, the science community and many other societal actors, can probably be considered as the most complex public policy issue, ever to confront the international community. The major objective of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive overview of the numerous dimensions of climate change, by describing a summary of the current scientific and political arena in which the discussion on global warming takes place. Several developments will be discussed seperatly. First, section 2 will elaborate on the scientific background and policy conditions of climate change. In section 3 an explanation will be given on how climate change developed in the international scientific and political community. Next, the outcome of this global process, the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), will be discussed in more detail. The development of a global treaty with so many different parties has been a most complex process. This is clearly understood if one concetrates on the different starting point and interests of the major countries. Therefore, regional aspects of implementing climate policies of successively, developed countries (IC's), countries with economies in transition, and developing countries (DC's) will be described in more detail in section 4. Finally, conclusions are drawn in section 5. 2. CLIMATE CHANGE - SCIENCE AND POLICIES For a discussion on the political process with regard to global warming, it is essential to understand the scientific aspects of climate change (Section 2.1), which will be divided into the physical causes (Section 2.1.1), the effects (Section 2.1.2) and the scientific uncertainties of climate change (Section 2.1.2). Next the climate policies (Section 2.2) will be elaborated, which respectively address the causes - limitation strategy (Section 2.2.1), address the impacts - adaptation strategy (Section 2.2.2), and address the uncertainties of climate change - precautionary principle (Section 2.2.3). 2.1. Science 2.1.1. Causes The greenhouse effect is a natural phenomenon that keeps the earth warmer than it would otherwise be. The main natural greenhouse gases (GHGs) are water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O) and ozone (O3). GHGs by their physical properties let pass the short- waved solar radiation but absorb the long-waved infrared radiation emitted by the earth as it is heated by the sun. The earth would be 33ûC colder without this naturally occurring greenhouse effect (Watson et al., 1990). Tropospheric water vapour (H2O) is the single most important GHG. Yet, its atmospheric concentration is not directly influenced by anthropogenic emissions but indirectly through temperature. Similarly, ozone (O3) formation/degradation is not a direct but an indirect result of anthropogenic emissions. Therefore, in analyzing the enhanced climate change, H2O and O3 are usually not included. As depicted in table 1, the chemical composition of the Earth's atmosphere is changing. This is mainly due to human activities. Since the industrial revolution, atmospheric CO2 concentrations have risen by twenty-five percent, from 280 to more than 350 parts per million. This anthropogenic influence has become truly significant after 1960. The sources of greenhouse gases are very divergent. The anthropogenic increase of CO2 mainly results from the burning of fossil fuels such as coal, oil and gas, and changes in land use (deforestation). CH4 originates from cattle, sheep, landfills and wet rice production. N2O is primary emitted from chemical processes in the soil and water surface as a result of, for instance, fertilizer use. Finally, CFC's and HCFC's are industrially manufactured gases, used in refrigerators, foam blowing and solvents. Examination of table 1 demonstrates that the anthropogenic influence on the radiative balance and thus on the climate system is already significant, is rapidly increasing, and, as stated by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)[1], will lead to perceptible climate changes. Table 1. Summary of Key Greenhouse Gases Influenced by Human Activities1. Atmospheric concentrations CO2 CH4 N2O CFC-11 CFC-12 Units2 ppmv ppmv ppbv pptv pptv Pre-industrial (1750-1800) 280 0.8 288 0 0 Present day (1990)3 353 1.72 310 280 484 Current rate of change per year 1.8 0.015 0.8 9.5 17 (0.5%) (0.9%)(0.25%) (4%) (4%) Atmospheric lifetime (years)4 50-100 10 150 65 130 source: Watson et al., 1990. 1. Ozone has not been included in the table because of lack of precise data. 2. ppmv = parts per million by volume; ppbv = parts per billion by volume; pptv = parts per trillion by volume 3. The current (1990) concentrations have been estimated based upon an extrapolation of measurements reported for earlier years, assuming that the recent trends remained approximately constant. 4. For each gas in the table, except CO2, the `lifetime' is defined here as the ratio of the atmospheric content to the total rate of removal. This time scale also characterizes the rate of adjustment of the atmospheric concentrations if the emission rates are changed abruptly. CO2 is a special case since it has no real sinks, but it is merely circulated between various reservoirs (atmosphere, ocean, biota). The `lifetime' of CO2 given in the table is a rough indication of the time it would take for CO2 concentrations to adjust to changes in the emissions. 2.1.2. Impacts The IPCC mentions that, under a Business-as-Usual emission scenario[2], the main impact of the increase of the GHG concentration in the atmosphere is that the global mean temperature over the next 100 years is expected to rise at a rate of approximately 0.3ûC per decade (with an uncertainty range of 0.2ûC to 0.5ûC per decade) (Houghton et al., 1990). The impacts of climate change vary significantly per region and per season. The warming is predicted to be 50-100% above the global mean in high northern latitudes in winter. Landsurfaces will warm more rapidly than the ocean. Precipitation is expected to increase in middle and high latitudes especially in winter. Enhanced precipitation is also expected in the tropics (Mitchell, 1990). Consequently, global warming will initiate a shift of climate zones. Estimates show that an increase of one degree in temperature would cause a shift to the North in climatic boundaries of agriculture by 200-300 kilometres (Izrael, 1991). Therefore, existing methods of agriculture and forestry will be constrained on their original locations. Adaptation (probably through trail and error due to the uncertainties) to the new conditions will be required, creating considerable ecological and economic costs. The impact on society may especially be felt by a rising sea, caused by the thermal expansion of the water as well as the increased melting process of glaciers and polar ice sheets. Warrick and Oerlemans (1990) estimate that the predicted increase in temperature will lead to a rise of 3-10 centimetres per decade. Even with actions to reduce global emissions, a considerable rise in sea level over the next century is still foreseen on account of the greenhouse gases which are already present in the atmosphere. Low lying coastal areas, where population and agriculture are often concentrated, are directly threatened and for the small island states, the long term existence is at stake (Gilbert and Vellinga, 1990). A most important impact of climate change on society, leading to large costs, is the changes of the patterns, frequencies and intensities of extreme weather events. Although science is not able to explain this phenomenon adequately, the recent increase of damage as a result of extreme weather events may be an indication of the predicted relation between temperature rise and rougher weather. Especially a Northward shift of the pattern of gales and hurricanes, exposing unprepared and more vulnerable areas, would have a major impact on society. In addition, other types of climate extremes such as high-temperature events (>35oC) are expected to occur more often, causing increased droughts. At the same time, cold waves will take place less frequently and less intensely. Such effects could be damaging for agricultural productivity[3]. The IPCC (1990) also predicts a shift from gradual precipitation to local heavy rainfall. Consequently, the risk of river floods increases. A positive impact of climate change on agriculture is the so called fertilizer effect of an increased atmospheric CO2 concentration on plant growth. So far, however, experiments have not been able to conclusively prove the overall effect of climate change on the agricultural productivity[4]. As besides CO2 fertilisation, other effects of climate change will influence agriculture, such as temperature, extreme weather events, soil moisture changes, precipitation, pests etc. Considering the full range of these impacts, regional computer models estimate a decrease of the agricultural output of 10-15% in Africa, Latin-America and certain parts of India and Southeast Asia (Fischer et al., 1993). Global warming is also projected to have considerable consequences on health. Although winters will be less severe and consequently cause less morbidity and mortality, the negative impact of milder winter is likely to overshadow these benefits. Temperature rise and precipitation change will affect vector species such as mosquitoes, water and air quality and stress conditions. Consequently morbidity and mortality will probably increase as a result of enhancing of respiratory, vector-born and water-related diseases. In addition, heat waves will occur more often causing increased stress, especially in urban areas. At the same time, local food shortages should be expected as a result of bad harvests (Rouviere et al., 1990). Especially, the less resilient population is the most vulnerable and consequently will suffer most. Besides a gradual change in the climate system, sudden instabilities can not be ruled out. Paleo-records indicate that approximately 10,000 years ago the temperature probably increased by 7ûC in a period of only 50 years. In the same period the sea level rose at a rate of several meters per 100 years. A sudden change of ocean current from one quasi equilibrium pattern to another equilibrium pattern, is the most plausible explanation. Model experiments have confirmed that such a type of shift may also be triggered by increasing GHG concentrations in the atmosphere. A most intriguing feature of such `flip-flop' climate changes is that they are irreversible. Yet another threat of human induced climate change is the so called `runaway' greenhouse effect. Through global warming additional GHGs may be released by vegetation, oceans and soils. This way the greenhouse effect would be a self accelerating phenomenon through positive feedbacks. This could, for instance, happen when large quantities of methane would be released as a result of thawing of tundra soils, which would in turn lead to an additionally enhanced greenhouse effect. Similarly the earth may respond by absorbing more GHGs through ocean current shifts and/or plant growth. Such effects are still highly uncertain; current observations, however, indicate the possibility of dominating positive feedbacks (Houghton et al., 1992). 2.1.3. Uncertainties A major constraint for actions to limit climate change are the uncertainties. At present, uncertainties exist with regard to almost every aspect of the greenhouse effect (e.g. the sensitivity of the global average temperature and mean sea-level to the increase in GHGs, the timing of the expected climate change, the natural variations of the climate, and the regional climatic impacts). This may well lead to paralyse stakeholders who postpone decisions or implementation of emission reducing measures (De Freitas, 1991). To overcome these uncertainties, substantial progress would be required by science. However, the chances that such uncertainties are resolved quickly are limited. It is indeed likely that the effects of climate change will be felt earlier than full scientific consensus about the effects of climate change is accomplished. Given the largely irreversible nature of climate change and its long term features, delaying action in the hope that new information will resolve or, at least, reduce uncertainty is a dangerous strategy. How should scientific uncertainties be dealt with? Besides the policy option of narrowing climate and impact uncertainties by continued intensive scientific research, other points of focus can be distinguished, such as the development of new production and consumption technologies in order to reduce limitation costs and the accomplishment of immediate reductions in emissions aimed at curbing the global warming process. Each of these options is essential and therefore it is difficult to choose the optimal portfolio (Manne & Richels, 1991). Figure 1. The Policy Dilemma; the trade-off between the effectiveness of measures and the scientific (un)certainty (Vellinga an Swart, 1991) Given this situation, one must be aware of the relation between (un)certainty regarding the consequences of enhanced climate change and the effectiveness of response options, and especially how this relation changes over time. Figure 1 illustrates this trade-off. Emisssion reduction measures taken today will prevent GHG from being emitted for many years in the future. A limitation measure taken in 2050 will be insufficient to compensate these accumulated emission reductions. Therefore, the present effectiveness of emission limitation is relatively high. At the same time, the present certainty with regard to the greenhouse effect is rather low. In the future the certainty is likely to increase as a result of the scientific process and monitoring and thus policy makers will be more certain whether or not to take certain measures. However, as mentioned, these measures will be less effective (Vellinga & Swart, 1991). 2.2. Policy Basically two types of policies can be distinguished in responding to climate change. First, in order to minimize the causes of global warming emission reduction measures or carbon sequestration can be initiated. This response is called a `limitation policy'. Secondly, one can focus on the effects of climate change and apply `adaptation policies', such as building higher dikes for the protection against sea level rise. The two policies are closely related: the less you limit climate change, the greater the adaptation cost are likely to be. Yet, even with full focus on limitation, adaptation measures will be indispensable, since limitation measures can never fully eliminate climate change[5]. An appropriate climate policy will not focus on either one of these policy options but use a combination. However, both limitation and adaptation policies are constrained by the existence of scientific uncertainties. Therefore, the `precautionary principle' will be discussed as a tool to link climate policy with scientific uncertainties. 2.2.1. Addressing the causes - limitation strategy At present most limitation policies focus on the emission reductions of GHGs and follow a `gas by gas' approach. The reasoning behind this is that, as the exact greenhouse warming equivalents[6] for all the different GHGs are not yet known with any degree of certainty, it is more sensible to consider the different gases separately in the first phase of policy making. Once the exact greenhouse warming potentials are known, a `comprehensive' gas policy can be applied with trade offs between gases. In such a comprehensive approach, a combination of the most effective measures are chosen irrespective of the GHG they are focused at (Rijsberman et al., 1993). In encountering the causes of climate change, both short term and long term positive side effects are generated. Such measures, which can be justified even in the face of scientific uncertainties because they make sense for other reasons than climate change, can be characterized as `no- regret' policies (Bodansky, 1993). Limitation measures, such as improvement of energy efficiency will, for example, besides reducing CO2 emissions, also enhance economic performance, reduce other pollutant emissions and increase energy security. Similar positive side-effects can be realized with other limitation measures such as the use of cleaner energy sources and technologies, improved forest management and expansion of forest areas, phasing out of CFC's, improved livestock waste management, and altered use of fertilizers. On the longer term, sustainable development will be the most useful theme for limitation policies. Sustainable development in this respect implies increased efficiency in resource use and strive for renewable resources and thus less GHG emission. Long-term measures should be implemented at both national and international level. Examples of long term limitation measures are accelerated and coordinated research programs, development of new technologies (in particular renewable such as solar and biomass energy), review planning, encourage beneficial behavioral and structural changes, and expansion of the global observing and monitoring systems (IPCC-RSWG , 1990). The international dimension of limitation policies is of major significance. Climate change is probably the most prominent transboundary environmental problem on earth. Through the weather and climate system GHGs are continuously mixed around the earth. Thus, emissions of greenhouse gases in one location can eventually cause damage at the other side of the earth; every nation will be affected by it in one way or another. Emissions are originating from all parts of the world. Therefore, only a worldwide limitation strategy can be effective. At first instance, limitation measures should be initiated by the IC's. Such an approach is legitimate for historic reasons, for the present emission situation, and for the current capacities of these countries to limit emissions. At present, industrialized countries (IC's), who form only 20 % of the world's population, are responsible for approximately 75 % of the global CO2 emissions. Projections under `Business-as-Usual' conditions indicate modest but continuously growing emissions in these IC's. Therefore, the IC's are expected to take the lead in addressing the climate change problem. It is very likely that emission reductions in these countries of 1-2% per year would be necessary to keep climate change within `acceptable limits'. Nevertheless, CO2 emissions from DC's, are growing fast in order to meet their development requirements. Over time, they are likely to represent an increasingly significant percentage of global emissions. Estimates show that the CO2 emissions of DC's, presently growing by 4% per year, will be equal to those of IC's by the year 2030 and outweigh those of IC's thereafter (Swart and Vellinga, 1991). In order to reach a situation in which the IC's reduce GHG emissions and the DC's simultaneously redirect their economic development into a low-emission growth track, a global strategy is required. Figure 2 depicts a conceptual scenario in which the IC's will take the lead in emission reduction at short term and the DC's on average will moderate the growth of emissions (2% annual growth in stead of the present 4% per year) for the next 40 years and will reduce thereafter as well. Yet, the Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs)[7] that presently grow with 4-6% CO2 per year should follow the IC's control patterns considerably earlier. Figure 2. A conceptual strategy for the limitation and reduction of global fossil fuel carbon emissions for industrialized and developed countries (Vellinga and Swart, 1991). For such a development to take place, international political consensus regarding a global strategy is essential. Several obstacles exist which complicate such an agreement (Bodansky, 1993). First, because the causes of the greenhouse problem are deeply embedded in the world economy, stakes in the negotiations are very high. Many different sectors, such as transportation, industry, agriculture and forestry, are involved. Consequently, as a result of the diverse economic and social characteristics of the different countries, divergence of interests is also large. For instance, as will be explained in the following, the stakes of the Small Island States are completely unlike those of the OPEC members. Another obstacle is the large number of parties participating in the political process. Although it is necessary to involve every nation in the world - more than 150 states participated in the UNCED Conference in Rio de Janeiro - this also constraints the progress of the negotiations. The process is especially complicated by its multi-dimensional characteristics. Not only do negotiations take place between the IC's, negotiations also redefine the North-South dialogue and the discussion among DC's. A final constraint which was continuously dominant in the climate negotiations, is the existence of scientific uncertainties with regard to almost every aspect of climate change. In the following sections, the impact of the various obstacles will be explored. But before, attention will be given to the issue of adaptation to climate change. 2.2.2. Addressing the impacts - adaptation strategy In contrast to limitation policies, adapatation policies do not focus on the causes of climate change but concentrate on the impacts. For example, crop planning in the agricultural sector can be modified to adjust to changing climatic conditions. Independent of the limitation policies, adaptation policies are critical for a number of reasons. Because it is believed that there is likely to be a time lag between emissions and subsequent climate change because of the accumulated GHG's so far, the global climate is already commited to a certain change. Adaptation measures will therefore be necessary regardless of any limitation actions that are taken. Similar to side-effects of limitation policies, climate adaptation policies may generate beneficial side-effects. For instance, emphasizing coastal vulnerability research helps to identify potential areas at risk for sea level rise or extreme weather events. At the same time these findings can lead to improving safety against normal weather extremes and climate variability. Similarly, effects can be generated through adaptation strategies in the field of resource use and management, addressing the potential impacts of global climate change on food security, water availability, natural and managed ecosystems, land, and biodiversity. In other words, also adaptation policies encompass numerous no-regret options (Bodansky, 1993). The precise impacts of climate change on natural resources and human activities are, although gradually improving, poorly understood. Still two types of adaptation strategies can be distinguished. On the one hand, specific measures can directly be addressed to specific effects on specific sectors. This `effect-by-effect' approach does not consider the fact that one sectoral measure can affect other sectors. On the other hand, an `integrated approach' can be applied which includes the integration of programs and plans for economic development and environmental quality management. 2.2.3. Addressing the uncertainties - precautionary principle Scientific uncertainties will never be fully eliminated (Popper, 1959). Therefore, policy makers and other economic participants will have to deal with these uncertainties. If an experiment does not confirm or disprove a certain theory or correlation, scientist can continue to gather more information, but policy actors must choose a course of action. In order to deal with uncertainties many policy makers have adopted the `precautionary principle'[8]. In essence, this principle which originates from marine pollution issues, says that rather than await certainty, governments should act in anticipation of environmental harm to ensure that this harm does not occur, or as the old saying goes, `An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure' (Bodansky, 1991). Transposed to the climate problem, this means that the risks connected to the rapid increase of the anthropogenic GHG concentration and its related influence on the global climate - in excess to natural variations - form sufficient reason to initiate GHG emission reduction measures; the currently existing uncertainties of climate model simulations should not be an argument not to take precautionary measures (Jansen et al., 1993). The IPCC explains that an immediate emission reduction from human activities of over 60% would be required to stabilise the atmospheric GHG concentrations at todays level (Houghton et al., 1990). Only one Earth exists; experiments such as enhanced climate change with potentially far reaching consequences for future generations have moral implications of an unprecedented nature. Although the precautionary principle is useful as a general goal, it is unsuitable as the ultimate solution for climate change. As it does not specify how much caution should be taken, it is too vague to serve as a regulatory standard. In order to know how and when to apply the precautionary principle, one needs to know the risk and the uncertainty of an activity. To get a better notion of the risks involved, decision models should be applied to understand, for instance, the consequences of an `act - then learn' scenario versus a `learn - than act' scenario. In fact, a `learn and act' scenario is often regarded as the optimal strategy (Manne & Richels, 1993). In addition, precautionary measures would be better based if scientists more often quantified the extent of (un)certainty in terms of probabilities (Tol & de Vos, 1993). Only then decision makers can comprehend the costs and benefits of taking, or not taking, a measure with regard to the complex climate problem. One way to avoid the consideration of uncertainties is to limit climate policy to no-regret measures. Within this option, priority is given to instruments that serve other objectives (social, employment and environmental), and simultaneously result in a reduction of GHG emissions. In fact, such policy is not a truly climate policy, since these measures already make sense for other reasons than climate change. In between the two extremes of no-regret and the measures that follow from the precautionary principle, several middle courses exist. Traditionally, uncertainties are dealt with by establishing `insurance premiums' to compensate against unforeseen events. The middle course policies thus initiate no-regret measures plus additional investments in emission limitation as an insurance premium. Such an insurance premium is paid in order to partly compensate for the damage which will be caused if climate change appears to take place and to avoid having to implement drastic action in a short time. Whatever strategy is adopted by policy makers, there is no guarantee that serious environmental harm is prevented. Many of today's most serious problems were unanticipated and would probably not have been prevented even if decision makers would have chosen for the most cautious approach (Bodansky, 1991). Nevertheless, ignoring enhanced climate change while scientists indicate the possible dangers, is entirely unwarranted. Therefore, climate change was recognized by the international community and evolved into probably one of the most complex public policy issues ever to confront decision makers, involving a wide range of participants varying from heads of state to local officials, and multinational industries to environmental organisations throughout the world (Reinstein, 1993). 3. CLIMATE CHANGE - GLOBAL ASPECTS 3.1. Historical development The international negotiations on the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) took place between february 1991 and May 1992, under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee (INC) created by the United Nations General Assembly in its Resolution 45/212 passed on December 21, 1990. In fact, the negotiations began earlier and will continue for many years to come. In this section, several tracks will be described which influenced the current results. 3.1.1. The Scientific track[9] The problem of climate change was signalled already in the 1970's. The first global discussion on climate change, which was organized by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO), can be traced to the World Climate Conference in 1979. Climate change was recognized as a serious problem. The Conference ended with a declaration that stated: "The Conference finds that it is now urgently necessary for the nations of the world: [...] (c) to foresee and to prevent potential man-made changes in climate that might be adverse to the well-being of humanity." Six years later, WMO organized a meeting with the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) and the International Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU) at Villach to consider the role of greenhouse gases in causing climate variations. Scientists from both IC's and DC's concluded that, "increasing concentrations of greenhouse gases are expected to cause a significant warming of the global climate in the next century". The Brundtland report "Our Common Future", which was published in 1987 by the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) pays considerable attention to the risks related to anthropogenic climate change. "How much certainty should governments require before agreeing to take action? If they wait until significant climate change is demonstrated, it may be too late for any counter measures to be effective against the inertia by then stored in this massive global system." In response to the call for action by WCED, the government of Canada invited 300 world experts to The Toronto Conference on the Changing Atmosphere in 1988. For the first time both scientists and policy makers discussed climate change. The Toronto Conference concluded with the recommendation that countries should: "Reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 20% of 1988 levels by the year 2005 as an initial global goal". This historical target is referred to as the Toronto Target by the international community and had considerable significance in the previous discussions on climate change. At present the influence of this target is diminishing as fewer countries find it feasible. Later that year (1988) the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) was established under the joint auspices of the WMO and the UNEP. This panel was charged with the responsibility of assessing the scientific information related to the various components of the climate change issue, and to formulate realistic response strategies for the management of this problem. For this purpose, three working groups were formed to study the scientific aspects, the impacts and the response strategies. In addition, a group was set up to facilitate the participation of DC's in the IPCC process.The working groups undertook a detailed review of the state of knowledge in each of these areas over the next two years, and at its fourth Plenary, in Sundsvall (Sweden), in August 1990, the IPCC approved its First Assessment Report. It concluded that under a `business as usual' scenario, there would be an average increase in global mean temperature of 0.3ûC per decade which would result, among other things in a rise in sea level of six centimetres per decade and that through measures it may be possible to limit this to 0.1ûC per decade. The IPCC discussed the various limitation and adaptation strategies such as improved energy efficiency, promoting the use of clean energy sources, improved forest management, phasing out of CFC's, improved waste management, developing emergency plans especially for risk prone areas etc. In addition, the IPCC recommended that countries should start to negotiate a convention (Rochon et al., 1990). In February 1992 the IPCC issued a supplement to its 1990 report, updating work done in the intervening year and a half and essentially reaffirming the 1990 conclusions. This supplement was intended to assist the INC negotiations, which were at that point approaching their final phase. The negotiations, however, were being motivated almost entirely by political forces rather than by scientific analysis, and as the IPCC supplement mainly confirmed earlier scientific findings, it had little impact on the outcome of the negotiations. 3.1.2. The Political track[10] In the meantime political momentum was building up. 1989 was the year of political meetings on climate change. The first international political agreement explicitly on the issue of climate change is the Resolution adopted at the 43th session of the General Assembly on 27 January 1989. This Resolution was directly in response to a proposal of the Government of Malta and was indirectly in response to the growing international consensus reflected in meetings beginning with the first World Climate Conference in 1979, the UNEP/WMO/ICSU Conference held at Villach, Austria in October 1985, the Toronto Conference in 1988. In March, 1989, at the invitation of France, Norway and the Netherlands, representatives of twenty-four countries, of which seventeen Heads of State or Governments, were invited to The Hague to consider the issue. At this Summit in the Hague, they declared their commitment to addressing the problem of climate change. The original goal of this meeting was to develop a new regime (UN-security council like) on global environmental issues. This, however, appeared too far reaching to get agreement about. Nevertheless, the fact that heads of state were dealing with climate change reflected the increasing importance of the issue. In Africa, another political meeting was held where Heads of Francophone countries met at Dakar in May 1989, to endorse the Hague Declaration and to set an agenda for action. That same year several other political efforts were made, which set the ground for the explicit discussion of various aspects of the issue of climate change at Noordwijk, the Netherlands. This led to the adoption of the Noordwijk Declaration on Climate Change by 67 countries in November 1989, which proposed, inter alia, the following targets: Long term target: "Stabilizing the atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases is an imperative goal. The IPCC will need to report the best scientific knowledge as to the options for containing climate change within tolerable limits. Some currently available estimates indicate that this could require a reduction of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions by more than 50 %." In order to stabilize the atmospheric concentration of GHGs, the trend of increasing emissions should be reversed. Therefore, the initial goal is to stabilize emissions in the short term. Simultaneously, sink management (i.e. forest preservation and replanting) should be improved. The following step implies a reduction of GHG emissions. Consequently, in Noordwijk the following `short term' targets were formulated: CO2 Target: "In the view of many industrialized nations such stabilization of CO2 emissions [at 1990 levels] should be achieved as a first step at the latest by the year 2000." Forestry Target: (21)Agrees to pursue a global balance between deforestation on the one hand and sound forest management and afforestation on the other. A world net forest growth of 12 million hectares a year in the beginning of the next century should be considered as a provisional aim. This meeting had considerable political impact internationally and later that month, the Maldives hosted the Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise at MalŽ, when climate change was discussed for the first time by the vulnerable small island states. By the end of 1989, climate change was very high on the international agenda of developing and IC's. In April 1990, US president George Bush invited policy makers of several countries for the White House Conference on Science and Economics Research related to Climate Change. The Conference strongly supported the need to integrate scientific and economic research on global change as an alternative to the more difficult measures of emission control. Later that year, ministers of the Economic Commission of Europe (ECE), a United Nations (UN) regional grouping of Western and Eastern Europe and North America met in Bergen, Norway, in May 1990 to prepare for the upcoming UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), scheduled for June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. Explicit notion was given to the precautionary principle which should guide action and polities to address the problem of climate change. The first regional target on this issue was set, when the EC met in October 1990 to establish a CO2 target for EC countries as a whole. This clearly was a political signal towards the upcoming Second World Climate Conference (SWCC), held in Geneva, in November 1990. The SWCC was attended by 137 countries and can perhaps be recognized as the biggest governmental meeting focusing on environmental issues prior to UNCED. Several questions which arose from the previous conferences were addressed. The precautionary principle was collectively accepted as an integrated part of any global strategy. "In order to achieve sustainable development in all countries and to meet the needs of present and future generations, precautionary measures to meet the climate challenge must anticipate, prevent, attack, or minimize the causes of, and mitigate the adverse consequences of, environmental degradation that might result from climate change. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing cost effective measures to prevent such environmental degradation." In determining who must take the initiative, the SWCC declaration stated that: "Recognizing further that the principle of equity and the common but differentiated responsibility of countries should be the basis of any global response to climate change, developed countries must take the lead." Before the SWCC, the members of the EC had committed themselves to stabilize CO2 emissions by the year 2000 at 1990 levels and were joined shortly before the conference by the members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). Canada, Australia, and New Zealand independently adopted similar political commitments, in some cases including other GHGs. Japan, which had been cautious to that point about commitments that could seriously affect its energy costs and therefore its industrial competitiveness, also joined the EC and the mentioned OECD countries. Among IC's, only the United States was without some kind of emissions target. In the end, the SWCC ministerial declaration basically finessed the issue of the nature of commitments by IC's by calling on these countries to: "... establish targets and/or feasible national programmes or strategies which will have significant effects on limiting emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer." Since most countries already had either a target or a national strategy, this appeal had little impact on the attending countries. Nevertheless, the SWCC was an important event because for the first time DC's participated as equal partners in the discussions and made clear that North-South issues would play a prominent role in the coming negotiations. 3.1.3. The UN-policy Development track The issues of additional financial resources for and technology transfer to DC's has been the subject of considerable differences between the IC's and the DC's for many years. The climate issue served to provide a new context for revisiting these old concerns. Against this background the UN General Assembly met in the fall of 1990 and began the debate that resulted in Resolution 45/212. Two themes emerged during the discussions. One was the question of form and process, namely the relationship of Intergovernmental Negotiation Committee (INC) being established by the resolution to other UN bodies, including the General Assembly itself. The other was the substantive nature of the commitments to be negotiated: would there be separate protocols on CO2 emissions by the energy sector, on forest, and so on, and in view of earlier resolutions by the General Assembly, what would be the commitments of IC's on financial resources and technology. With regard to the first question, the resolution referred to "an effective framework convention on climate change, containing appropriate commitments, and any related instruments as might be agreed upon", thus establishing the INC as the forum where any negotiations on convention and protocols would also take place. No parallel negotiations on the protocol would be held outside the INC. The question of the concerns of DC's was more difficult to resolve and continued to be a major issue throughout the negotiations. In this discussion Resolution 44/228 of the previous year, which had decided on convening UNCED (the Rio conference) and established the Preparatory Committee (Prepcom) to prepare the conference, had a central place, because this resolution referred to "new and additional financial resources" and technology transfer "on concessional and preferential terms". Finally, 45/212 simply considered that the climate negotiations "should be completed prior to the UNCED conference in June 1992 and opened for signature during the Conference." The resolution also reaffirmed "the principles embodied in its resolutions 44/207 [which expressed concerns about climate change] and 44/228, which take into account the concerns of all States and the specific needs of developing countries." In the following two years, preceding the Rio conference several INC meetings were held. The diversity among the different participating groups was enormous. Countries from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union indicated that they might have trouble reaching and adhering to the proposed targets in view of their "economies being in transition". DC's took a range of positions, some saying the text was only relevant for the OECD countries and others saying OECD countries must take special efforts and pay `compensation' to DC's. The real issue for the DC's was the provision of new financial resources and transfer of technology. The INC meetings which followed dealt with several issues. First, the negotiation process was organized in two workgroups which were chaired by different countries which optimally represented the many interests that would have to be reflected in the negotiations. Some developments were new in the UN proceedings. For example, recognition of the Small Island States as a group had never occurred before. Another example is the election of Japan as the representative of the Asia Pacific region. Japan is a major IC's and therefore is expected to have completely different political and economical interests than most of the Asian and Pacific countries. Secondly, several strategies were proposed to tackle the climate problem. From the beginning the United States had argued for a `bottom-up' or `no-regrets' approach which started with taking those actions that were justified for other reasons then climate change. The principal criticism of this strategy was that it could not be guaranteed to produce a specific result. It contrasted with the `top-down' approach of those favouring targets and timetables for GHG reductions. An attempt to compromise these views was made by Japan, who introduced the concept of `pledge and review'. Each country would `pledge', either targets and timetables or a national programme or strategy (or both). Other countries through a formal review mechanism could than `review' or comment these efforts and as appropriate, make suggestions for improving them in the next `pledge' cycle. It was meant to serve two purposes: the unilateral pledges would be a one-way ratchet towards stricter commitments by the parties, and the international review process would promote transparency and accountability. Although formal agreement was far from being achieved, the deadlock was finally broken at the end of the fifth INC session, when the US and the UK worked out the compromise language that shows great resemblance with Article 4(2) (see following section). The final negotiating session before the Rio conference, took place in New York in May 1992 (INC-5 second part). Based on discussions with a number of key negotiators, the INC chairman prepared a `chairman's text' out of the US-UK compromise. Immediately, informal negotiators started to develop refinements that would make it clearer and more acceptable to a larger group of countries. The final text was very carefully crafted to try to meet the needs of as many countries as possible while still being acceptable to all IC's. On the evening of May 9, 1992, the world's first truly global environmental agreement that linked in a dynamic way environmental protection and economic considerations was finally adopted. Whether it will be adequate in combating climate change will be discussed in the following section. 3.2. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 3.2.1. Description of the Convention To many, the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was not fully satisfactory. The convention contains vague and mainly voluntary commitments on stabilization of GHG emissions by IC's. Furthermore, it fails to establish a permanent financial and technology clearinghouse, nor does it provide a system of tradeable emission rights. Nevertheless, given the complexity of both the issue and the negotiations, reaching an agreement at all in such a limited period of time is a major accomplishment. It recognizes climate change as a serious threat and establishes several guiding principles as a basis for future action. Especially, the fact that it creates a process designed to improve our knowledge and consequently may lead to the mitigation of uncertainties, will be of great significance to many governments and industries (Bodansky, 1993). In the following, the objective and the impact of the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change will be elaborated in more detail. In article 2 of the Convention the objective is formulated as follows: "The ultimate objective is to achieve stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened, and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner."[11] Commitments of the IC's on emissions are described in article 4, paragraph 2. In subparagraph (a) it is recognized that "the return by the end of the present decade to earlier level of anthropogenic emissions of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol would contribute to" the modification of longer term emission trends. This commitment takes into account many factors, including differences in "starting points and approaches, economic structures and resource bases, the need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth, available technologies and other circumstances." The language of this paragraph is more a `best efforts' political commitment to send a strong signal than a legal commitment to actually achieve a specific level of emissions in a specific year, that is, a target and timetable as originally proposed by the EC and other countries (Reinstein, 1993a). What gives the commitment force is the process laid out in the other subparagraphs of article 4, paragraph 2 (Reinstein, 1993b). Subparagraph (b) calls on IC's to provide detailed information on actions taken to reduce emissions and projections of resulting emissions "with the aim of returning individually or jointly to their 1990 levels" of these emissions. This information will be reviewed by the Conference of Parties (COP) on a regular basis. Differentiation of response measures is operationalized in Article 4, paragraph 1, by mentioning "common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances" of the parties, thereby distinguishing between commitments of developed and developing country parties. As a result a complicated structure of commitments evolved, consisting of: (a) general commitments, which apply to all parties, (b) specific commitments on sources and sinks, which apply to the parties listed in Annex I (OECD and the former socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the former USSR), and specific commitments on the transfer of financial resources and technology, which apply to the parties listed in Annex II (only the OECD countries). The impact of this distinction will be discussed in the following sections. 3.2.2. Implementation of the Convention A key role with regard to the implementation of the convention is played by the Conference of Parties (COP) (Zammit Cutajar, 1993). The first session of the COP will take place within 12 months after the 50th ratification of the treaty[12]. During this session, which will probably be in early 1995, the COP will review the information of the parties concerning their national programmes for limiting emissions of GHGs. Until then the INC, which will be dissolved at the first session of the COP, will have to prepare a great deal of work. For instance, it has to provide guidelines so that IC's can start preparing their submissions using a consistent format. The INC must also decide how to arrange financial support for convention-related activities by DC's. In this matter the INC (or COP) will also need to decide on the meaning of "agreed full incremental costs", which is stated in article 4(3), as the basis for funding projects in DC's. DC's are not subject to the same level of expectation, given their need to address fundamental issues of poverty and low standards of living. Article 4(1), states that all parties should initiate actions, "taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances." This differentiated responsibility of DC's is recognized by the Convention by declaring that "their energy consumption will need to grow." However, the Convention does not include several provisions supported by DC's, such as references to the need for "adequate, new and additional financial resources" and transfer of technology on "preferential concessional and non-commercial terms" (Bodansky, 1993). Although article 4(3) states that annex II countries "shall provide new additional financial resources to meet" the costs incurred by DC's in complying with their obligation and article 4(5) states that IC's commit themselves to "take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how" to DC's, it is also states that these commitments are enforceable for "the agreed full incremental costs of implementing measures". IC's deliberately kept this term vague, to prevent excessive financial claims from DC's. Consequently, as long as the costs of DC's are not specified and acknowledged by the IC's, DC's will have to bear these costs them self, and technology transfer will most likely only take place on commercial terms. Thus the legal basis as put down in the FCCC is relatively weak. This precludes that the IC's are not really willing to provide large flows of finances, at least not without detailed control over the use of such funds. For scientific and technological advice, the Convention will draw mainly upon the IPCC. In this way, effective communication between the policy-makers involved in the Convention process and the researchers and experts active in the IPCC process will be assured. Working group I of the IPCC will help to determine whether the science of climate change justifies going beyond the approved commitments. Working group II will need to assess the environmental and socio- economic impacts of climate change and the adaptive ability of ecosystems, agriculture, infrastructure and socio-economic systems to climate change. Moreover, Working group II will assess the methods and feasibility to limit the nett emissions of GHGs. Especially energy and land use strategies and related instruments to limit CO2 and other GHG emissions, will be evaluated. The role of working group III is to formulate realistic response strategies for the overall management of the climate change issue based on global emission scenarios and macro-economic considerations. Most important in the near term is the task of the IPCC of identifying and facilitating the characterization of various technologies in the broad sense, including `soft' technologies (techniques, know how), which can be used to mitigate and adapt to climate change. Each of these can be characterized by individual countries according to feasibility factors that must be evaluated in their national situations, including technical, economic, and market feasibility. Every party of the convention can then draw upon this inventory of technologies to find those policies and measures that combined form its national `Climate Action Plan'. For OECD countries such plans must be reported to the secretariat of the convention along with the estimated GHG reducing effects of their actions to the end of the decade. The Conference will review the action plans against the background of the IPCC's assessment and other relevant information. Each IC will be expected to demonstrate how it is contributing to the global effort in the light of its individual situation. The financial resources to facilitate the transfer which are agreed upon, can be provided both bilaterally and multilaterally. The bilateral cooperation will mainly exist of projects which aim at promoting efforts in DC's and economies in transition that will result in reductions of net GHG emissions and contribute to economic development. At present, the most discussed form of bilateral cooperation is the so called `joint implementation'. Companies and utilities in IC's initiate projects in other countries instead of taking `relatively expensive' measures in their own region. Article 4(2) states that "developed country Parties and other Parties included in Annex I may implement ... policies and measures [which limit their anthropogenic emissions of GHG] jointly with other Parties and may assist other Parties in contributing to the achievement of the objective of the Convention...". The idea is to perform projects in order to achieve global emission limitation in the most cost effective manner. It can, for instance, be much more effective in terms of CO2 reduction to spend one dollar on emission reduction in a DC or in Eastern Europe (e.g. repairing gas leakages, improve efficiency of electricity generators, planting of trees) than in a `relatively energy and emission efficient' IC. At present, however, international consensus with regard to joint implementation is lacking, partially as a result of the indistinctness of the capacity of this type of limitation strategy to fight climate change. In addition, such opportunities could discourage industries in IC's to take measures in their own countries. Research often emphasizes the existence of negative cost options with regard to potential energy efficiency measures in IC's. In other words, `no-regret' opportunities should not be neglected. Another problem of joint implementation in DC's is the difficulty of ownership and credits registration[13] and verification of claimed emission reductions. Consequently, large scale implementation of these international activities can only be achieved after an international consensus regarding joint implementation has been realized. Some of the practical constraints could be avoided by a more multilateral approach. For instance, an international Clearing House could act as an intermediate and an arbitrator to match donors and recipients. An organization which could play an important role as international Clearing House is the Global Environmental Fund (GEF). In November 1990, it was established by UN Development Programme (UNDP), the UN Environmental Programme (UNEP), and the World Bank, as the international entity that should provide funding for addressing global environmental issues. Before the Rio conference, the GEF was entrusted by the INC as major financial intermediate on an interim basis. This was only marginally supported by the DC's, who strongly feared conditionality of financial support provided by other parts of the World Bank. Because of the distinct linkage between the World Bank and the GEF, they favoured the foundation of a separate fund. But even with the existence of an international clearing house, some caveats will still remain. First, problems of registration and verification will not fully disappear. Moreover, an intermediating institute will increase the costs of transactions. Secondly, attention should be given to sustainability of the mechanism. For example, the mechanism should not lead to planting forests on fertile soils in DC's as this would compete with agriculture. Finally, a clearing house mechanism should not be used as an alibi for a non- policy regarding the stabilization of CO2 emissions in the IC's. After all, good housekeeping should remain a local priority. Therefore, in order to meet the projected targets and timetables, national policies and measures will be the major incentives for companies and utilities to reduce emissions. In addition, joint implementation in Eastern Europe and DC's could help IC's to fulfil their obligations under the Convention, and even more important, it could help to effectively improve local technologies through the direct involvement of the private sector. 3.2.3. The Negotiation process Evaluating the process of the climate negotiations leads to an interesting conclusion. Although, most of the time was spent on formal negotiations with numerous participants, the major results have been accomplished at informal meetings between a limited number of people. In addition, continuous interactions between scientists, politicians, policy-makers, Non Governmental Organizations (NGO's) and the media, have provided impulses to the decision making processes. Each of these actors have been essential for setting the stage for the development of a global strategy. Every negotiation process is unique, and the climate negotiations were no exception. But there are some general characteristics that are common to most negotiations. There is a formal process, with a plenary where all the countries are represented and often two or more working groups or committees which report to the plenary where the more specific aspects of the negotiations are taken up in detail. Sessions of the plenary and/or the working groups are chaired by individuals chosen through a formal process, in the UN system usually reflecting a balance of regions and political groups. Each country is officially represented by one or more individuals (a delegation) and formal statements of country positions are generally made by the head of that country's delegation in a formal session of the plenary or a working group. The plenary and the working groups may adopt formal rules of procedure to guide their work. Simultaneous translation into the official languages is generally provided at all sessions of the plenary and the working groups. Documents containing negotiating text for consideration is also provided in all the official languages (except in the smaller working groups). The plenary must approve and adopt the text of any agreement resulting from the negotiations, and proposals for text must be introduced through the formal process, usually initially in one of the working groups. Paralleling and supporting this formal process is an informal process that may have several levels. Various regional or interest groups frequently meet to consult and often coordinate on positions that may be taken in the formal process. Examples of such groups are the Group of 77 (G-77) and China, which consists today of more than 130 DC's, the IC's which are members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Member States of the European Community (EC) and sometimes the EFTA countries operate jointly. During the climate negotiations the OECD countries met under the informal name "Common Interest Group'. Sessions of such interest groups, while informal in the sense that they are outside the formal negotiation process, may still be rather formal in character, with chairs chosen according to rules or political considerations and other aspects similar to formal sessions. Principal delegates of countries (heads of delegation and/or chief negotiators) frequently meet and consult on a truly informal basis, examining how they might resolve differences and advance the negotiation process and sometimes developing text to be introduced into the formal process. Such consultations occur often on the margins of the formal sessions, over lunches and dinners, and so forth, and may also occur in other locations during the intercessional periods. It is in fact through these informal efforts that most of the real progress on difficult points is achieved. Such informal meetings never have any written records. As such it is often difficult to identify the progress or non- progress of negotiationsOutside of both the formal and the informal negotiation process there are various activities that may influence the process on different ways. Industry interest/lobby groups and other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as environmental groups, are normally present at formal sessions as observers and seek to have their views accepted by country delegations. Press and other media representatives may cover major negotiations, such as climate, and government representatives and other may often try to use the media to influence the negotiations. A mechanism sometimes applied is isolation of a country delegation that is blocking progress. In the formal process such a blocking party is usually not exposed. But NGO's together with the press and informal help of some country delegates can deblock the process by growing international political attention. Sometimes delegates received new instructions from their governments during the two week sessions, not because they asked for it but because the issue was raised in the home-press. 4. CLIMATE CHANGE - REGIONAL ASPECTS Climate change is considered an important phenomenon by both rich and poor countries. Eventually, the Convention was signed by 155 States and the EC at the Rio conference in June 1992. "It is a package which contains something for almost all of the negotiating States but leaves none entirely satisfied" (Sands, 1992). During the process of negotiations, several groups clustered which formed an efficient representation of the complex international field of interests. These interests were of a diverse nature. First, and most important, the economic features of a country were of major significance. Roughly three economic clusters could be discerned: the DC's, the countries with economies in transition and the IC's. This distinction will also be the framework for this section. Second, the physical conditions played an significant role. Countries such as Switzerland have less to fear from sea level rise than Bangladesh. Also the energy dependency and CO2 emission conditions of the different parties were of great relevance. Table 2 depicts the large differences in CO2 emissions of the major countries which led to a logical positioning of the various countries. Finally, political factors influenced the final composition of the Convention. For instance, the power and impact of environmentalists in the political systems can have major impacts on the position of the countries attitude in the climate negotiations. Based on these criteria, several cases will be described. Table 2. 1989 CO2 total and per capita emissions from industrial processes. Country Total Percentage of per capita per GDP (1000 ton) world total (ton/inhabitant) (kg/$) World 21,863,088 -- 4.21 1.0 US 4,869,005 22.3% 19.68 0.9 USSR 3,804,001 17.4% 13.26 1.4 China/India 3,040,549 13.9% 1.47 4.5 EC 2,562,318 11.7% 9.17 0.5 Eastern Europe 1,193,167 5.5% 8.82 3.1 Japan 1,040,554 4.8% 8.46 0.4 source: The World Resources Institute (1992). 4.1. The Developed Countries The IC's are responsible for the major part of the global GHG emissions so far, and thus will have to play the leading part in solving the issue of global warming. Besides the fact that IC's are the largest emitters, they also have the best available technologies to reduce emissions. Nevertheless this group was far from united during the negotiations. Their positions were extremely diverse. This can be recognized in the Convention were in article 4(2) it is stated that each IC is required to take those actions it has identified as appropriate and feasible in its national circumstances. In the following discussion on the position of certain countries, focusing on the major parties (United States, the European Community and Japan), the interpretation and impact of these individual parties will be elaborated. 4.1.1. The United States With 22% of the total global CO2 emissions, the United States (US) is the world's largest GHG emitter. Also on a per capita basis, its CO2 emissions are the world's highest. These facts are often raised by representatives of DC's in order to emphasize the historic responsibilities of the US. The US approached the climate issue in a rather unique way compared to Europe, Japan and other OECD countries. On the one hand, the scientific awareness and knowledge about climate change was relatively high due to relatively high budgets and well established scientific institutes for climate science. On the other hand, the US was the most timid of all OECD countries in endorsing ambitious policies on climate. This was in part due to questions and concerns arising from preliminary economic analysis done by US experts and in part due to the conservative ideology of top White House officials. Because of its large size, its geographic separation by two oceans from Europe and Japan, and its very different constitutional, legal and political system, the United States often has a tendency to see things differently and to `go it alone' on a number of issues. Climate, in this regard, was not a unique exception. The US rationale was based on the premise that as long as scientific uncertainty regarding the impact of global warming remained, it was premature to agree on targets and timetables. Stressing scientific uncertainties the US sought to go slow on responding to climate change, thereby protecting the domestic industrial sectors most closely tied to energy production and consumption (coal, oil, autos, chemicals, primary metals). This strategy was opposed by the majority of other OECD countries, which had all adopted emission targets. During the negotiating process, the US represented the single counterbalance to the momentum of most OECD countries to move forward quickly. If the rest could be accused of an excess of idealism relative to pragmatism, the US was certainly guilty of an excess of pragmatism relative to idealism. But one could also analyze the US position versus the other OECD countries, as a practical versus political standpoint. The US was simply not convinced that a climate policy with targets and timetables could accomplish the projected emission reductions. The EC, on the other hand, did believe that the strength of a climate policy would be adequate. In the end, the combination of US arguments and the large influence it exerts as the world's largest economy and emitter of GHGs caused the rest of the world to agree to a compromise text in the climate treaty that balanced concerns on both sides. After the US presidential election in November 1992, the new US President, Bill Clinton, announced that there would be a new US policy on climate. On 19 October 1993, President Clinton unveiled what he called a `detailed, realistic, and achievable' plan to return national GHG emissions to their 1990 levels by the year 2000. The strategy emphasizes measures that can be implemented rapidly and without congressional approval. The program's success or failure will fully depent on the response of the US society to prove they can control their emissions through voluntary measures and a minimum of government intervention. The administration warns, however, that it will propose `additional administrative, regulatory, or legislative actions', if the `voluntary' approach fails. 4.1.2. The European Community In the international discussion on climate change, the European Community (EC) played an important role as a collective actor. The EC is responsible for about 12% of the world's total annual CO2 emissions. Unlike the US, the EC took a very progressive stand during the climate negotiations, being prepared to endorse a convention that included specific targets and timetables to stabilize CO2 and other GHG emissions. One reason for this dominant appearance was the rapidly growing environmental awareness in all sectors of society in the EC. A second reason was the new challenge faced by the Member States to build a European partnership. Therefore, in October 1990 the EC agreed to stabilize the total CO2 emissions by the year 2000 at the 1990 level for the Community as a whole. In addition, EC members acknowledged the necessity to reduce the rate of deforestation, aiming at an increase of the sink capacity of the world's forest reserves. Because the EC decided to stabilize the carbon dioxide emissions at Community level, this created some flexibility among the Member States. The more IC's, such as Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark, would make a greater effort in cutting emissions, creating the margin necessary for the less developed countries, such as Spain, Portugal Greece and Ireland, to increase economic growth and the (to some extent related) emission of CO2. Such a flexible approach, which is called `burden sharing', was necessary to bring all EC parties in the game (Vellinga and Grubb, 1993). For example, at present the total carbon emissions per capita of Portugal is about 1 ton whereas this rate is more than 3 times higher in Germany. Consequently, the Member States have made different commitments with respect to the stabilization target. Belgium, France, Luxembourg and Italy have unconditionally adopted the EC target. Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Greece have adopted the EC target on the condition that their CO2 emissions are allowed to grow. Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands have made further commitments than the EC target. The UK was the only Member State who originally planned to set 1990-2005 instead of 1990-2000 as target period. Eventually, also the UK joined the EC regime in October 1990 (Schepers, 1991). The EC strategy is based on a combination of the principle of no-regret and the search for the least cost solution. In this regard, the Commission has suggested to use a large variety of instruments such as voluntary agreements, R&D efforts and, most important of all, an energy/carbon tax. Yet, as a strong collective agreement at EC level could not yet be reached, the actual implementation of the measures is left to the responsibility of the individual Member States. So far, this approach has not proved to be very successful (Vellinga and Grubb, 1993). The complex constitutional structure of the EC is still evolving in the environmental field, as it is in other fields, such as foreign policy. Hence the establishment and implementation of EC greenhouse gas policies is constrained with various political frictions, which will both complicate the EC role in international negotiations, and hamper internal implementation. Attempts to establish EC policies on global warming have coincided with the intensifying conflict over formal moves towards greater monetary and political union. An important example of this friction (between on the one hand environmental versus economic interest, and on the other hand individual versus community interests), is the recent effort to implement a community-wide carbon tax. The UK clearly opposes the proposal because they can see no reason why they should overachieve in order to compensate for the underachievement of others. At the same time, six EC countries -Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and The Netherlands- said that the EC cannot possibly meet its obligations unless the energy/carbon tax is adopted in due course at Community level. This incident emphasizes the difficulty of a common target with such large diversity of countries (Wynne, 1993). 4.1.3. Japan Japan's share in the world's CO2 emission accounts for less than 5%. However, beyond this relatively modest share in the world's total CO2 emissions lie more significant, technological aspects of its global role. As far as the limitation of CO2 emission is concerned, Japan has achieved one of the highest levels of energy conservation among the IC's. Compared to an extensive growth of GNP from the 1970s, CO2 emissions increased only slightly until the end of the 1980s. This tendency owes much to the technological progress of energy conservation (although the result is slightly biassed because an important share of primary energy intensive production sectors have moved to other countries in South-East Asia). Thus, especially on a CO2 emission per capita basis, Japan is ahead of the EC and far ahead of the US (see table 2). It is therefore not surprising that Japan followed the EC in promoting targets and timetables (albeit on a per capita basis). Japan and the EC jointly opposed the more hesitant attitude of the US and the OPEC countries (Bodansky, 1993).Because of the high population densities on Japan's main islands and the spectacular growth of its industrial facilities in the 1950s and 1960s, Japan was one of the first industrialized market economies to react to some of the acute effects of modern industrial pollution (Vernon, 1993). As a result of this relatively early initiation of an environmental policy in Japan, current environmental improvements are less obvious compared to other countries. Japan is one of the countries which have achieved the most remarkable fuel switching results in the world since the first oil crisis. Due to its high level of energy conservation, the CO2 limitation cost in Japan is much higher than in any other country. Making further progress in these fields is difficult both in term of technology and in term of costs. Japan (together with Germany) was on the forefront of those countries viewing the Convention also as an instrument for gaining longer term competitive advantage by requiring the further development, production, use and dissemination of innovative new technologies. In addition, Japan supports the idea to transfer some finances and technologies to other, especially, DC's. In contrast to the US and Europe, the course of Japanese policies has some of the characteristics of a supertanker under way. The probability that some entity in the government structure will take an independent line and disregard or override an existing international agreement is low. Unlike the significant influence of environmental/green NGO's in other OECD countries, informal forces in Japan had relatively little impact on international environmental policy making by Japan (despite Japan's domestic activism in some environmental matters). Programmes are shaped much more by expert opinion than by political pressure (Vernon, 1993). The crusading elements so evident in the European and US environmental movements, are scarce but growing in Japan's policy making establishment. With the economic developments continuing to grow, Japan's energy consumption since 1987 also keeps growing much larger than predicted. This makes it harder for Japan to attain the CO2 stabilization targets. Over the two years from 1988 to 1990, GNP grew an average 5.3% per annum and energy consumption increased an average of 4.5% annually, pushing CO2 emissions up to 7.2% in two years. The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) in Japan, has made unusual remarks saying that Japan could be urged to make drastic reviews (downward revisions) of her economic growth and energy policies if she should come to face extremely difficult situations in the international context in such an agenda as CO2 stabilization in the short run (Matsuo, 1992). Actually MITI had planned a large scale investment in nuclear energy to allow for increasing electricity demands, while meeting the CO2-stabilization target. Due to public pressure, however, the nuclear plans are very difficult if not impossible to implement. Without an increase of nuclear energy production, drastic changes in the future shape and management of the Japanese energy economy would be required to meet the CO2-target, according to the MITI. Besides, such restructuring would seriously impair Japan's ability to meet the international request for adjustments of Japan-US structural impediments. Thus, this is not an easy scenario by any means. It should be mentioned here that the Environment Agency of Japan has taken a more optimistic view on these matters, stressing the opportunities for energy efficiency increases. In the field of diplomacy and active international policy development Japan, like Germany, has played a modest role since the Second World War. In the field of global policy making Japan was often following the US. The climate negotiations were one of the first examples where Japan took a position different from the US by following the EC. This must be due to a number of factors. First, the EC was a rapidly growing economic and political factor in the late 1980s. Second, Japan was becoming more self conscience viz ˆ viz the US; it was interested to take a leadership role in the global climate issue (maybe to compensate for environmental unfriendly positions in other issues like drifnet fishing and whaling). And thirdly, Japan recognized the technological challenge of the climate change issue. 4.2. The Countries with Economies in Transition The problems faced by the former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, led to a novel distinction being drawn in the Convention. For reasons of differentiating the specific commitments relating to sources and sinks of CO2, a distinction is made between developed countries and developed countries undergoing the process of transition to a market economy. The Central and Eastern European countries show falling emissions at present due to the economic restructuring. So, while they were hesitant about committing themselves, they appeared to be further along than any other group of countries in terms of CO2 emission reduction. On the other hand, as soon as the process of transition is completed, emission trends may well increase again. In this section Eastern Europe and Russia will described separately. 4.2.1. Eastern Europe The rationalization process of the energy consumption in Eastern Europe has not yet taken place. While in the fifties, Western Europe dominated Eastern European countries in terms of CO2 emissions, in the eighties the overall energy-related CO2 emissions in Eastern Europe became almost twice as large as those observed in Western Europe. Also on a per capita basis CO2 emissions from Eastern European countries are high in comparison with Western Europe. On the one hand this contrast can be attributed to the efficiency improvement in Western Europe. On the other hand it results from the inefficient utilization of energy in Eastern Europe in the past 30 years. In 1985, the average energy intensity of industry, in terms of joule per Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in Eastern Europe was much higher than in Western Europe. This implies that, under the conditions of no-regret, Eastern Europe holds great potential for the improvement of energy intensity. Limitation measures can reduce production costs, reduce energy consumption, and reduce CO2 emissions per unit of GDP and per capita. Theoretically, this means that Eastern European countries can continue to increase production without necessarily increasing CO2 emissions. Also the international energy dependency is a good reason for Eastern Europe to increase efficiency. As a result of the process of transition, the present position of Eastern European countries is unusual. Although the level of energy efficiency remains unchanged, total energy demand is decreasing. This decrease, however, is only temporary. Eventually, the transition process will be completed and the economy will recover. Without efficiency measures, energy consumption will return to its previous level, leading to both economic and environmental damage. In order to accompany the transition process with efficiency improvement, several measures are discussed. Price reforms could play a major role in this regard. In addition, and in conjunction with price reforms, best available technologies will be very effective in meeting these goals. In this regard, technology transfer from the other IC's, as mentioned in the Convention, could play a significant role. In fact, large interest exists among Western European energy utilities to initiate projects and cooperations in order to receive emission reduction credits. Whether such an approach (joint implementation) will get off the ground, however, is still to be seen. In the negotiation the Eastern European countries played a receptive and sometimes a constructive role. In the preparations for the Second World Climate Conference and for UNCED there were regular contacts between the EC (and EC member countries) and Eastern European countries. The EC countries assisted the Eastern European countries to do their CO2-assessment and in view of the political situation in Europe it is not surprising that the Eastern European countries, such as Poland, New Tsechia, Slowaky, and Hungary, adopted (or agreed to) similar CO2 targets as the EC as a whole. Their position in the negotiations was dominated by a basic concern about climate change and by the eagerness to join the EC countries. 4.2.2. Russia Russia's power and role changed considerably during the process of global policy development. Russian scientists were among the first to recognize the importance of the greenhouse effect and climate change. Much of the Russian scientific work is based on an analysis of climate changes in the past (palaeoclimatology). The Russian scientists recognized the catastrophe potential, however, they also recognized the potential gains for Russia in a warmer climate. The Russian government has always stressed the benefits of climate change. In the negotiations the Russian Delegates took the position that it would be very premature to take any actions to limit emissions. During the negotiations the influence of the Russians on the process decreased to almost nil as on some occasions it was not even clear how the Russian Federation was represented and what the mandate of the negotiations was. In fact, the national and international priorities for Russia left no room for any strong role in the climate issue. With respect to the emissions of GHGs the position of Russia is very similar to that of the Eastern European countries mentioned above. As a result of the dissolution of the former USSR, initiated by the transformation process of its originally centrally planned economy, the level of emission of GHGs dropped significantly. However, this emission reduction is not the result of an improvement in energy efficiency and is likely to be eliminated as soon as the Russian economy recovers from its transition process. At present, by accounting for 17% of the global CO2 emission, Russia occupies the second place in the list of major CO2 emitters in the world, and consequently still plays an important role. But besides being a large consumer of energy, Russia's international role is especially significant as an energy producer. More than 20% of the world production of oil, and almost 40% of the world gas production, originates from Russia (Makarov and Bashmakov, 1990). Exhausting oil, gas, and coal resources, the former USSR simultaneously has been accumulating the highest in the world energy conservation potential. Cost-cutting investments were invisible in the process of inefficient planning, and as a result, in spite of cost-efficiency of the major part of the potential, a very insignificant amount of fixed investment was directed to the realization of energy efficiency measures. Studies of the Moscow Centre for Energy Efficiency (MCEE) indicated that when energy prices would approach world prices a vast number off energy efficiency measures could be implemented without any costs. Not only economic and social gains can be realized. Energy efficiency improvement would also be the cheapest and most effective way to stop further environmental degradation. For instance, the reduction of pollution from the oil and gas production and transportation can lead to a reduction in the number of oilspills, methane leakages, gas flaring and pipeline breaks which are currently typical for Russia (Bashmakov, 1992). Scenario's estimate that, under the assumption that measures for emission reduction are not permitted to increase energy development investment costs by more than 15%, emission growth can be halted in the period between 1995 and 2000. Emissions growth can be reduced by 14% by 2005, with a steady decline of 25% by 2020 and 35% by 2035 (Makarov and Bashmakov, 1990). Besides its large energy conservation potential, Russia is also important with regard to its current natural resources. For instance, the Siberian region with its extensive forest areas performs a significant role in the absorbtion of CO2. Future economic growth forms an serious threat for these forests to be cleared. Another sink in North Russia is the tundra. Global warming could cause the soil to change from a sink into a source of CO2, which consequently will accelerate climate change (runaway effect). A similar process is expected with regard to the extensive permafrost areas in the far North of Russia. 4.3. The Developing Countries Although GHG emission from DC's and their financial and technical capability to reduce these emissions is limited, their position is nevertheless of crucial importance to the climate negotiations and implementation. First of all, DC's are faced with a considerable growth of the population which will enhance future GHG emissions. DC's presently generate roughly 25% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions and at about half the world's methane and NO2. Even with substantial improvements in energy efficiency, DC's will need to expand their energy production and CO2 emissions in order to meet the demands of population and economic growth. Second, the greater part of the current global sink capacity of GHG, such as tropical forests, can be found in DC's. With current rates of deforestation, this important sink will vanish fast. Finally, DC's are not only leading contributors to future climate change, they are also likely to be its chief victim. Many DC's are extremely vulnerable to the impact of climate change. Much more of their income is derived from climate- sensitive activities like agriculture or fisheries. Furthermore, climate change is likely to hit poor countries the hardest because they lack wealth to afford adaptation and the infrastructure and technology to accomplish it. As a result of the large variety of interests, DC's were also divided during the negotiations. Three groups emerged as particularly important: the powerful and self conscience semi-industrialized DC's - such as India, and China - who emphasized the development, and sovereignty and equity issues, the oil-producing states, who fiercefully questioned the need for strong commitments by either developing or developed countries and called for compensation, and the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), who most immediately are at risk from climate change. In addition to these three groups, a number of less distinct parties emerged such as some African states who stressed the issue of desertification and drought, and Malaysia and Brazil[14] who argued against singling out forest from among other GHG sinks. Only the three main groups will be discussed in this section. 4.3.1. India/China More than half the world's coal reserves are located in just four DC's: South Africa, North Korea, China and India. China and India alone account for over 50% of global coal production. At the same time, almost 40% of world's population lives in China and India. Projections of the World Bank estimate an increase of these two billion people of 50% by the year 2025 (Global Environmental Change Report (GECR), 1993). Current substantial economic development will also lead to an increase of the level of prosperity, which in turn inevitably will have a considerable impact on the total demand for energy. The International Energy Agency (IEA) projects that global consumption will jump to 45% over the 1990 level by 2010. Consequently, China is expected to be the number two emitter within the next 10 years. At present, the rate of growth of CO2 emissions is far greater than any major country. The present annual and per capita emissions are relatively low. India and China's annual CO2 emissions are in the order of 1.5 ton per capita as compared to 9 and 19 ton per capita in the EC and the US respectively. Nevertheless, improvements in energy efficiency could still contribute significantly in attempting to curb the release of GHGs. Japanese researchers have estimated that if all the world's existing coal-fired power plants were converted to efficient clean coal technologies, CO2 emissions from coal-fired electricity generation would drop by 30% (GECR, 1993). Therefore, India, China and many other DC's attach great importance in the issue of technology transfer. In their view, IC's should transfer advanced technologies to DC's under the most favourable conditions and provide technologies to promote renovation of energy industries as well as to achieve the effect of reducing CO2 emission as early as possible. Nevertheless, the negotiations did not result in distinct agreement with regard to technology transfer. As mentioned, the Convention does not define the terms on which transfers will occur. Besides being large potential emitters of GHGs, India and China face a substantial threat of climate change. China's and India's large population is basically fed on the base of domestic than rather foreign sources, their agriculture largely being dependent on the weather. Impact assessment indicates that China agricultural production potential will reduce at least by 5%. Also, China's 18.4 thousand kilometres long coastline, which houses the main economic activities, could be seriously jeopardised by a possible sea level rise (Guang and Zhihong, 1993). However, the idea that the DC's would likely be the main victims was hardly ever raised by the major DC's. Their position was dominated by the fear that the OECD countries would set a global regime for CO2 control that would take away their opportunities for development. Because of this overruling concern the major DC's did not really press for actions to reduce CO2 emissions by OECD countries as they feared that over time OECD commitments would start a process through which commitments to curb the growth of GHGs would be asked from the DC's as well. So by this `instinct' they were mainly on the side of the US when targets and timetables were discussed. On the other hand, they were on the side of the EC when it came to technology cooperation. The EC-countries were a little more willing on this issue than the US-government. The main interest for the majority of the DC's was the idea that climate change provides a new impetus for the transfer of finances and technology from the `selfish' OECD countries to the `needily' DC's. The idea that the major DC's could take actions themselves to limit climate change was disregarded as an immoral proposal under the argument that existing development problems far outweigh the long term climate problems. When the IC's do not take the lead with domestic measures and lifestyle changes there is no real argument for DC's to take any action. 4.3.2. Small Island States and other low-lying areas The group of Small Island States, which is represented in the AOSIS, is a trans-regional group from the Caribbean, the Indian Ocean, South China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea, the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean. Their contribution in the increase of the atmospheric CO2 concentration is almost nil. Yet, the impact of climate change on the rise of the sea level is the major concern of the Small Island States and other low-lying areas. Over 50% of the world's population lives within 50 kilometres of the sea of which 100-200 million people live in very low-lying areas potentially subject to annual flooding. As the sea level rises, many of these people will lose their homes, means of livelihood, and in some cases, their lives. The major dilemma regarding the vulnerability of the Small Island States and other low-lying areas is the fact that adaptation of local conditions would be more effective in terms of damage than would be the option of emission reduction. Therefore, in the climate convention negotiations, a number of DC's (particularly the AOSIS) proposed the inclusion of adaptation as a fundable activity under the GEF. The GEF's guidelines as currently interpretated would not permit this and although the GEF's attitude towards these conditions are flexible, a number of OECD countries have made clear that they do not want to get roped into funding adaptation costs (Heileman, 1993). Although the AOSIS had a profound position in the negotiations, the actual impact of the organization is considerably constrained by the UN established geographic regional representation system. The AOSIS includes countries belonging to several geographical regions of the world. Even though small island states make up close to a sixth of the votes in the UN system, their population is much less than 1%. And in the establishment of a bureau or a decision-making unit often the economically more important countries were selected. Nevertheless, in the G-77 meetings, AOSIS ensured that some of its concerns were incorporated into the negotiation position of G-77. This indirectly increased the influence of the small island states and other low-lying areas. 4.3.3. The OPEC members The OPEC has a clearer difficulty supporting any sort of CO2 limitation. They are afraid that emissions restrictions would reduce both the size of the market and the price of oil and coal, which would lower their national revenues. The oil producing countries, led by Saudi Arabia, strongly opposed any substantive obligations in the Convention, and clearly would not have been unhappy to see the negotiations fail altogether. In the negotiation process the OPEC countries were rather succesful in slowing down the process of reaching agreement about measures and policies to controll CO2 emissions. Moreover the OPEC representatives were very outspoken against EC-initiatives to introduce CO2/energy taxes. 5. CONCLUSION The expectations of many governments and NGO's in the early stages of the Climate Change Convention, to go beyond existing international environmental agreements, e.g. by establishing a system of tradeable emission permits, and to create a basis for a truly sustainable development, were too high. "Compared to these ambitous proposals, the FCCC is a modest achievement" (Bodansky, 1993). For example, the Montreal Protocol is much more stringent, requiring a phaseout of most ozone depleting substances within a decade, while the FCCC does not even clearly require for stabilization of GHG emissions in the industrialized world. However, the climate change problem is considerably more complex, both politically and from a scientific point of view. Thus, the current FCCC can be considered as a good beginning for further progression. It involves a wide variety of states, it recognizes the distinctive position of the transforming and DC's, it strives for economic efficiency, it does preserve a certain degree of flexibility, and it lays a basis for future work such as national inventories and scientific research. The greatest disappointment, however, is the absence of strict targets and timetables. Yet, the most important message of the Convention is implicit, even in the absent of a strict target and timetable: business will not continue as usual. The challenge of implementing the FCCC, confronts society with much more than a climate problem. A suitable climate policy requires improvements in almost every sector of the economy; energy, transportation, industry, agriculture, etc. Increasingly, such remodelling will be taken up in an integrated manner, with trade-offs between longer-term benefits of environmental protection and short-term concerns about international competitiveness (Reinstein, 1993a). The implementation of the FCCC will not be a sudden process, but is more likely to be incremental, as two contradictory tendencies can be observed in the international policy arena (Hisschemoller, 1993). On the one hand, there is the tendency to wait for others to take initiative. Especially disputed environmental problems such as climate change are extremely prone to such "free rider" behaviour. On the other hand, an environmental awareness is developing which generates a tendency to act. In this consideration, also economic and technological opportunities serve as a driving incentive. The balance of these two tendencies is rather dynamic. As a result, it is not fully clear who is taking the lead in international climate policies. Until the Rio Conference, the EC was acting as a leading force, although this leadership was not irrefutable. The EC has never been completely united, and most of all, the European Commision has neither the power nor the authority to implement a coherent programme. At present, the US and Japan are making better progress in designing and implementing their national climate action plans. Especially under conditions of nationally changing politics, the international policy arena of climate change will not be settled during the coming years. A third reason for the implementation process to be incremental lies in the parallel development of the scientific evidence of climate change. Science is evolutionary. More signals will accumulate in the course of years. Uncertainties about the basic science will reduce only gradually, and frequently unexpected findings will arise which cannot always be explained conclusively. The major difference with other major environmental problems, such as acid rain and toxic pollution, is the absence of fully evident, and for society moving signals of climate change. Although impacts are already occuring, these are not fully associated with specific economic activities of society. Also impacts like for example extreme weather events are not yet automatically related with antropogenic climate change, though more and more prove indicates this relation. In other words, for a climate policy to be succesful, awareness with regard to climate change and its impacts is a prior criterion. Efforts should be made to reduce scientific uncertainties while simultaneously implementing of GHG emission reduction measures. At the same time, the dynamic international process of institutional structure building should continue in order to facilitate future developments. "The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change makes a definite, albeit tentative, start along that road" (Bodansky, 1993). 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Footnotes 0 Due to the continuously increasing fossil energy use, and to increased burning of biomass in developing countries, smog is no longer a threat only to large urban areas. Also rural areas are now suffering from smog (Fishman and Kalish, 1990). 1 More detailed information on the IPCC is provided in section 3.2.2. 2 Present economic growth will continue without any additional measures to reduce emission GHGs. 3 Milder winters will increase crop damage caused by insects and pests during the summer. Also, frost is essential for several trees to bear fruit. 4 In fact, research indicates that increased CO2 concentration indirectly limits plant growth, through the enhanced mineral nutrient sequestration by microflora, by which a lack of nutrients arises for plants (Diaz et al., 1993). 5 The climate scenario studies of Working Group I of the IPCC suggest that control policies on emissions can slow global warming, perhaps from 0.3ûC/decade to 0.1ûC/decade (IPCC, 1990). Climate change will therefore not be fully eliminated. 6 The potential contribution of GHGs to global warming is called the `global warming potential' (GWP). The GWP of a GHG is dependent on both the capacities to absorb radiation and the atmospheric concentration of the GHG. At present, in particular the absorbtion capacity of GHGs is relatively uncertain. 7 The NICs is the collective noun for the newly industrializing countries who followed the export substitution path to industrialization (i.e. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan). 8 In the Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC), which will be discussed in the following section, the precautionary principle is mentioned in article 3: "The parties should take precautionary measures to anticipate, prevent or minimize the causes of climate change and mitigate its adverse effects. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing such measures, ..." 9 This section is mainly based on G. Wolters, J. Swager and J. Gupta; A brief history of global, regional and national policy measures, Ministry of Housing, Physical Planning and the Environment, November 1991 10 This section is mainly based on R.A. Reinstein, `Climate Negotiations', in The Washington Quarterly, 1993. 11 To achieve a stabilization of concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere, the emissions over time may have to be reduced globally by 60%. Stopping the present annual growth of emissions of IC's through a commitment to stabilize emissions at e.g. 1990 levels would be a first step on the long track towards reduction of emission by 50%. Such a reduction strategy is likely to take at least 50 to 100 years. 12 Ratification by national parliaments is the formal/legal confirmation of the signatures of the heads of state when the FCCC was adopted. 13 Joint Implementation is a difficult concept. Numerous caveats exist with regard to both politics (equity issues, sovereignty pitfalls) and practical problems (registration, baseline assessment, double counting) (Jones, 1993; Heintz and Vellinga, 1993). 14 Brazil's position was also special for another reason. As host of the famous UNCED Conference in June 1992 in Rio de Janeiro, great effort was made by Brazil to bring the Conference to a happy conclusion.