Copyright 1993, Matthijs Hisschemoller, All Rights Reserved For more information contact author. INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS CONCERNING THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT What northern countries are doing and how each national position isinfluenced by beliefs about what other countries will not do Background paper for the Workshop on November 16, 17 in The Hague POLICY OPTIONS ADDRESSING THE GREENHOUSE EFFECT Matthijs Hisschemšller Institute for Environmental Studies, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, November 1993 Contents Page Summary 1. Introduction 1 2. The European Community 2 3. The United Kingdom 4 4. Germany 5 5. Japan 8 6. The United States 10 7. Conclusions 13 8. Discussion and recommendations 14 Literature 16 Summary This paper consists of two parts. In Sections 2 through 6 information about what the European Community, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the United States are doing to address the greenhouse effect is presented. These sections provide an over-view of policy strat-egies, instruments and measures that have been taken or announced by the European Commission and the respective country governments. The question dealt with in these sections is: What are, at the moment, northern countries doing in order to reduce their green-house gas emissions? In Sections 7 and 8 the findings are summarized. The following question is central to the sections: How can the Netherlands contribute to international climate policies? It is argued that the Nether-lands is doing relatively well compared to the other countries. It is further argued that national and international policies meet with two contradictory ten-dencies: first, the ten-dency to wait for others to take the initiative and second, the ten-dency to act, which is justified by awareness of the problem. In order to encourage the incremental international process, the Netherlands could promote two instruments. These are (1) the sustainability test for public policies and (2) the societal discussion, applied on an inter-national scale. 1. Introduction This paper gives a brief impression of national positions that northern countries take in addressing the greenhouse effect. The paper's objective is to answer two ques-tions: 1. What are, at the moment, northern countries doing in order to reduce their green-house gas emissions? 2. How can the Netherlands contribute to international climate policies? The paper is limited to the positions of northern countries. It will deal with the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, the United States and the European Community. These major OECD coun-tries and the EC together, are in the position to take the lead in the response to the problem of global warming. This is in line with the commitment of northern coun-tries to take the lead in reducing emissions. In Table 1, the total and per capita GHG-emissions of these countries are shown. It appears that the United States has the largest share in the worldwide emissions, while Japan, has the lowest share. Table 1. 1989 CO2 total and per capita emissions from industrial processes. Country Total Percentage of per capita per GDP (kg/$) (1000 ton) world total (ton/inhabitant) World 21,863,088 -- 4.21 1.0 US 4,869,005 22.3% 19.68 0.9 USSR 3,804,001 17.4% 13.26 1.4 China/India 3,040,549 13.9% 1.47 4.5 EC 2,562,318 11.7% 9.17 0.5 Eastern Europe 1,193,167 5.5% 8.82 3.1 Japan 1,040,554 4.8% 8.46 0.4 Source: The World Resources Institute, 1992. Sections 2 through 6 provide an overview of the goals, measures and primary policy instruments of the EC, the United Kingdom, Germany, Japan and the United States, respectively. In Section 7 the findings for these countries are briefly compared with the activities under the Dutch programme. Section 8 contains a discussion on the prospects for further international cooperation and the opportunities for a Dutch contribution. 2. The European Community During the late eighties, the European Community took a firm stand in the international debate on how to address the greenhouse effect. In October 1990, the Council of Minis-ters agreed to a political commitment to stabilize overall CO2 emissions in the EC by the year 2000, at 1990 levels. This commitment did not bind the member states legally, nor did every country commit itself to stabilizing CO2 emissions. The southern EC countries, Spain, Portugal and Greece especially, were informally exempted from this obligation. Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands took the lead. Germany even promised 25 to 30% reduction of CO2 emissions by 2005 at 1987 levels. This would allow the south-ern coun-tries to further increase their emission levels. In December 1990, the Euro- pean Com-mission proposed a three-pronged strategy: * Development of a comprehensive inventory of economically efficient measures for reducing CO2 emissions, as a basis for public information and further incen-tives; * Research and Development (R&D) on new technologies for CO2 abatement; * Fiscal measures for energy and transport (eco-tax). Because of strong opposition these proposals were not included in the Maastricht treaty, but they were not removed from the EC policy agenda either. It is expected that, in the near future, the EC will decide on an energy-carbon tax proposal in one form or the other, perhaps in combi-nation with compensation benefits for those companies making investments in energy-saving technol-ogies. In June 1993, the Council of Ministers agreed to establish a mechanism for monitor-ing and evaluating national programmes. In line with this Council Decision, the European Com-mission published a working paper, which contains a "First appraisal of existing national programs" in September 1993. The working paper sheds some light on the diffi-culties, most of them technical in nature, that have to be overcome before specific EC measures may be added to national policies. The existing national programmes are con-sidered "far from being complete, comparable and transparent, which makes their evalu-ation rather difficult if not impossible" (p. 3). Even the emission reduction targets are difficult to compare, since they do not all refer to the reference year 1990. The method-ologies used for assessing emission levels are far from adequately explained. The paper concludes that there is no guarantee that the EC commitments will be achieved (p. 7). The Commission recommends that each member state should provide the Commission with better quality reports based on higher standards. Proposed methods will be discussed with representa-tives of the member states. The Commission also states that although all member states have decided upon targets, they are in very different stages of develop-ment and implementation of their programmes. Within the EC, Germany, the Netherlands and Denmark are ahead, while Belgium, Greece and Portugal are still in the initial stage of identifying measures for reducing CO2 emissions (p. 6). Table 2 contains a brief com-parison of the existing national programmes. Table 2[0]. Existing national programmes for limiting CO2 emissions in the EC. reduction targeted information on decision target sectors emissions measures strategy Belgium no 5%/2000/90 all no yes no Denmark yes 20%/2005/88 all partly yes yes France yes +13%/2000/90* all yes yes yes especially transport Germany yes 25-30%/2005/ all partly yes yes 1987 Greece no +25%/2000/1990 power gene- yes yes some ration and transport Ireland yes +20%/2000/1990 all yes yes some Italy no stab/2000/1990 all yes yes some Luxembourg yes stab/2000/1990 all yes yes some Netherlands yes 3-5%/2000/1990 all yes yes yes Portugal no +30-40%/2000/ all yes some no 1990 except transport Spain yes +25%/2000/1990 all yes yes some United Kingdom yes stab/2000/1990 all yes yes some Source: Commission of the European Communities: First appraisal of existing nation-al pro-grammes (September 1993). * The official French target is 2 tonnes of carbon per capita in 2000/1990. When the population forecasts are taken into account this target leads to the increase men-tioned. This table illustrates the lack of data and indicates that in four countries the programme has not been the subject of a government or parliament decision. In other cases, the paper states that programmes are based upon political decisions, which does not mean that they are themselves accompanied by sufficient political support. Further, the measures men- tioned in the report to the Commission are no guarantee that they have already been taken. Hence, information on policy measures is not adequate. At best, the EC is making slow progress in developing policies to address the climate problem. Technical difficulties may turn out to reflect political differences. Standardisation of assessment methodologies may be used to delay European policy measures, like the introduction of a carbon-energy tax. EC policies on global warming coincide with the tensions that accompany formal moves towards greater monetary and political union (Wynne, 1993: 102). The basic reason is most likely a lack of political will to adequately follow up on earlier agreements. 3. The United Kingdom The United Kingdom has, so far, not been a leader in the international community in addressing the climate problem. In the summer of 1992 the government announced its present GHG emission reduction target: stabiliz-ation of CO2 emissions at the 1990 level by the year 2000. Till then, the official target date was 2005. The unstable state of the national economy, without doubt, contributes to a large extent to Britain's reluctance towards pushing for tougher climate policies. The UK government repeated-ly declared that its com-mit-ments to GHG reduction was conditional: the UK is willing to work on CO2 emission reduction levels, as long as other countries commit themselves to simi-lar goals[1]. However, the shift from coal to gas energy, as a side effect of the privatisation of the electricity supply industry since 1987, and pro-longed economic recession, have caused some confidence that the UK will meet its target[2]. In December 1992 the gov-ernment published a dis-cussion document, entitled "Climate change: our national pro-gramme for CO2 emissions". The British government intends to publish an action pro-gramme, containing strategies and measures, by the end of 1993. The update presented here, therefore, has a preliminary character. Measures and strategies aimed at reducing CO2 emissions and other GHG's are limited to promoting behavioural change on a voluntary basis. Programmes for advice on energy con- servation are prioritized in the UK-programme. The implementation must occur at a regional or local level. Instruments available to regional and local government are shrin-king. On completing Britain's CO2 programme the govern- ment, in a recent announce-ment, repeated that an effective and efficient national programme requires a 'partnership approach', e.g. a non- or least-coercive approach toward the targeted sectors. So far, the UK has taken the following measures: - In March 1993 a further increase in energy prices was announced in the domes-tic and transport sectors; - An Energy Savings Trust has been established to provide financial incentives for energy efficiency and an increase in the objective for the contribution of renewable energy; Local Advice was scheduled for Autumn 1993. Measures that have been announced are: - further renewable energy orders; - energy industries have been asked to achieve more combined heat and power in the year 2000 than targeted so far; - public sector bodies will take the lead in reducing energy use; - further action will be taken to help business to make energy savings. For this pur-pose the advice and information activities of the Energy Efficiency Office's programmes will be strengthened. This list of measures and strategies is not very specific. Wynne (1993: 119) states that "the UK response to GHG emissions control has been markedly different from that of other leading countries in the EC. It has been defensive and conditional on equivalent international action, highly market-based and non-interventionist, and with a wide gap between the willingness of local government to harness local public commitment and the shrinking resources and powers now available to them for playing the positive role." However, by 2000 the UK is likely to meet its target of returning CO2 emissions to 1990 levels. 4. Germany As a response to the issue of global environmental change, the German government decided in June 1990 to establish ambitious targets for reducing emissions of CO2 and other GHG's. The target was a 25 to 30% reduction of CO2 emission in the year 2005 at 1987 levels. The Bundesregierung intends to reduce all GHG emissions by 50% in 2005/1987. In September 1993, the German government confirmed these targets in its national climate policy report to the United Nations German climate policy. The report states that market economic policy instruments have priority. The German govern-ment also uses command and control measures and, like other countries, gives attention to education and research. The plan reveals an impressive collection of measures that are either being implemented or will be taken soon. In Table 3 an over-view is presented of the specific measures. Table 3. Individual measures for implementing the Federal Government's CO2 reduction programme. ( 1) Federal table for electricity ( 2) Windenergy promotion programme ( 3) Photovoltaic promotion programme ( 4) Act on the sale of electricity to the grid ( 5) CFC Halon prohibition ordinance ( 6) Unification Treaty / ecological clean-up plan for the new Federal Lander ( 7) Joint Federal Lander programme for district heating in the new Federal Lander ( 8) Tax benefits for heat / power cogeneration ( 9) Energy diagnosis programme (10) Consultation and advice for small and medium-sized companies (11) Credit/loan programme for small and medium-sized companies (12) Environmental label (13) Afforestation (14) Packaging Ordinance (15) Technical instruction on waste from human settlement (TA) (16) Heat protection (thermal insulation ordinance) (17) Ordinance on heating facilities (18) Ordinance on small firing installations (combustion plants) (19) Ordinance on heat use (20) Efficient and conservation-oriented energy use / increased use of renewable energy (21) Energy Management Act (22) Fee table for architects and engineers (23) Motor vehicle tax (24) CO2 limitation for motor vehicles (25) EC/CO2 energy tax (26) Levy on traffic (27) Mineral oil tax (28) Limitation on the application of fertilizers (29) Waste management and product recycling act Source: Bundesumweltministeriums, 1993: 12 and 107-109. More than half of these measures include financial incentives, since they refer to sub-sidies, prices, loans and/or taxes[3]. Measure 1 is worth mentioning. Germany has, for some time, been using price differentiation for electricity as an incentive for lower electricity con- sumption. The more electricity used, the higher the price per KwH paid by the consumer. Measure 4 refers to the obligation of power companies to accept electricity generated from renewable resources into the public grid power. It sets forth minimum rates to be paid for such power sold to the grid. Measure 22 includes an incentive for architects and construction engineers to provide special services related to effcient energy use and renewable energy in buildings. Most other measures imply setting some kind of rules or standards, sometimes in combination with financial incentives[4]. Some parts of the implementation will be dependent on EC policies in the near future[5]. A measure worth mentioning is the green label, an example that other countries (Japan) are also considering. The report acknowledges that voluntary commitments combined with 'compensation approaches' continue to be a significant impetus for reducing CO2 emissions. In 1991 the German industry committed itself to participate in a worldwide climate protection strategy. However, since voluntary action is considered part of a national strategy, accompanied by government intervention of all sorts, the German approach differs remarkably from the approach observed in the United Kingdom. In addition to the measures listed above, specific goals and measures are announced for the different sectors. For the energy sector a review and amendment of the rules and regulations for the energy industry law is envisaged. The goal is to increase environmental considerations in all kinds of energy related decisions by firms and utilities. There will be incentives for heat and power technologies. Coal subsidies will be substantially reduced by 2005, however, not stopped. Mixed-furnace power plants with integrated coal- gasification are being developed. There will be more use of natural gas, but this fuel will not be available in large amounts within ten years[6]. As mentioned, specific measures are being prepared for stimulating commercial use of renewable energies. At the same time, the report states that nuclear energy has an important role in the limitation of CO2 emissions. However, there is no consensus on the future role of the nuclear industry. In fact there is a delicate balance in keeping both nuclear energy and coal subsidies in the system. The German programme is higly specified and makes an ex post evaluation possible. There is, however, a widespread doubt as to whether Germany will be able to realize its CO2 target. This doubt can be justified by the argument that the Bundesregierung has little power over the strategic choices in the privately operating energy sector. Besides, the German government is quite reluctant to affect the interests of the subsidized coal sector. Although the 25 to 30% reduction by 2005 as targeted seems doubtful, a 5 to 10% reduction in the year 2000 for Germany must be considered a likely outcome of the policies. 5. Japan Japan contributes only about 4,8% of worldwide CO2 emissions. This is due to the fact that Japan has increased its energy efficiency considerably since the oil crisis. In October 1990, the goverment of Japan recognized that global warming was a serious problem to be addressed and decided to take part in the international activities for reducing the greenhouse effect. Japan adopted the target to stabilize per capita CO2 emissions at 1990 levels by 2000. In August 1993, Japan submitted an Action Programme to the UN, which gives a description of present and future measures (till 2010). In the Action Programme, Japan presents three national goals for addressing the climate problem. 1) The emissions of CO2 should be stabilized on a per capita basis in the year 2000 and beyond at about the same level as in 1990. In order to achieve the target, the programme comes up with a wide range of measures. 2) Efforts should be made to stabilize the total amount of CO2 emissions in the year 2000 and beyond at about the same level as in 1990. In order to achieve this target, which is slightly stronger than the commitment mentioned above, measures include the development of new technologies, including those related to solar, hydrogen and other new energies as well as fixation of CO2 at a pace and in a scale greater than currently predicted (Action Programme, p. 3). 3) The emissions of methane gas should not exceed the present level. To the extent possible, the emissions of other greenhouse gasses should not be increased (p. 4). The Action Pogramme includes measures for the following sectors. Development of urban and regional structures with low CO2 emissions This includes the planting of trees and greenery in urban areas so that high temperatures are moderated and, hence, the energy demand for air conditioning will be reduced. It further includes all kinds of energy conservation measures, like insulation of dwellings, passive solar for houses, solar water boilers, solar energy systems and photovoltaic cells, the reuse of unused heat from urban activities for airconditioning and the reuse of heat produced by waste incineration. Development of transport systems with low CO2 emissions This includes promoting cars of less weight and energy efficiency measures for cars (the introduction of electric cars), ships, trains, and aircraft. It further includes a shift from cargo transport to railways and ships and technical measures that improve energy efficiency in the trucking area. Simultaneously, public transportation will be promoted in metropolitan areas and, in order to reduce CO2 emissions from automobiles, a smooth traffic circulation (taking away traffic jams) will be ensured. Development of production structure with low CO2 emissions This includes increasing energy efficiency in industry, agriculture and fishery by shifting to new technologies and materials. Development of an energy supply structure with low CO2 emissions In the case of power generation, the use of nuclear energy will be increased. Moreover, the contribution of hydraulic and geothermal power, the use of photovoltaic systems, wind power and natural gas will be increased. Realization of lifestyle with low CO2 emissions This point includes the promotion of recylable products, reviewing distribution services on aspects like excessive packaging and huge amounts of direct mail. Environmental labelling (following the German model) will be introduced. Working hours should be limited to daylight hours. The programme pays attention to forest conservation and a rational use of timber resources. Special attention is given to the development of new technologies for the absorption and fixation of greenhouse gasses. The programme recognizes the need for increasing public awareness and the importance of international cooperation. It is not certain that all the measures listed in the programme will actually be implemented. On the one hand, little attention is given to what strategies and instruments will be used to achieve the specified goals. Japan uses tax incentives combined with subsidies in order to increase energy conservation, but energy prices today are even lower than they used to be. So, there is no guarantee that these instruments will be effective. Japanese policy regarding nuclear energy must also be treated with some caution. Nuclear energy reactors in Japan increasingly meet with low public acceptance. This has delayed the realization of government plans for building new nuclear power stations. On the other hand, Japan has a long tradition in environmental regulation and cooperation between government and industry. Standards set by government are mostly implemented on a voluntary basis, but firms must present annual reports on their emissions and investments in the environment. These reports are open to the public, which is an incentive for environmentally sound innovation. With the introduction of the new environmental management law, the government for the first time recognized the efficiency of economic incentives. Studies are underway to investigate the feasibility of some kind of an ecotax for Japan. Finally, Japan has a tradition in policy evaluation. The last evaluations show that for the past 2 years emissions in the industrial sector have stabilized, but this is partly due to a slow down in industrial activity. From the material presented it can be concluded that Japan has taken the climate problem seriously. On the basis of experiences with environmental policy so far, it may be expected that Japanese policies viz ˆ viz CO2 will be effective in meeting its stabilization target. However, it should also be mentioned that so far the strategies and instruments are not formulated in a clearcut manner. 6. The United States The United States emits the highest CO2 and other GHG emissions (about 25%). The per capita energy use, especially for transportation purposes, is significantly higher than in European countries. At the same time, energy prices are much lower than in other industrialized countries[7]. In spite of these facts, the Bush administration resisted commitments like stabilizing CO2 emissions by the year 2000 at 1990 levels (Bodansky, 1993). In a report, published in the last months of the Bush administration (December 1992), no targets were mentioned. It is extensively argued that the sum total of the effect of mitigation actions announced cannot be accurately quantified. It is, however, estimated, that these actions will result in a "net emission of carbon equivalent in 2000 of only 1.4 to 6 percent above 1990 levels" (Bureau of Oceans etc., 1992: 5). The Clinton-Gore administration brought about a shift in the White House attitude towards the climate problem. By October 1993, President Clinton and Vice President Gore revealed their Climate Change Action Plan. In this plan, they confirm their stand that United States GHG emissions must be returned to their 1990 levels by the year 2000. This target is, like in other cases, quantified for the various greenhouse gases. The action plan focuses on promoting energy conservation behaviour on a voluntary basis by business, power companies, agriculture and consumers. Many measures provide a reward for bahavioural change. The instrument highly favoured to promote action is the public private partnership (ppp). This instrument is expected to further the relationship between government and the private sector. Programme implementation may take place rapidly and without new legislative authority. For the international arena, the plan contains an extended paragraph on joint implementation. In order to achieve the target, about 50 measures are presented, most of them addressing CO2 emissions. All sectors are involved. The actions are catagorized as follows. Energy demand actions Federal departments will bring the most up-to-date technical knowledge to the people who need it and will establish pilot partnership efforts by the end of 1994, will expand the plan nationwide in 1995. The so-called 'green-lights efforts' will be doubled. A fund will be established for energy-management programmes in public buildings. Demonstration projects will help overcome the lack of confidence in new technologies. Customers who purchase efficient appliances will be awarded rebates. New residential appliance standards are announced and residential building codes will be better enforced. Experiments with so-called 'Cool Communities' will be taken beyond the pilot stage. These projects are based on the idea that shade provided by trees can reduce air conditioning loads. Thus, urban tree planting will be promoted where the energy saving benefits are highest (see also under Japan). For industry Pres. Clinton is directing the 'motor challenge', programmes to disseminate informaton on the cost saving potential of industrial motor systems. Financial incentives for energy efficiency in industry will be pooled and voluntary source reduction by using recycled or waste materials will be expanded. Transportation actions Perhaps the most interventionist measure concerns the transportation sector. The administration prepares legislation providing workers the option of receiving the cash value of employer-paid parking as a financial incentive to reduce solo commuting where alternatives exist. Further, a tire labelling programme has been announced. This programme is intended to help consumers identify tires with low rolling resistance. Energy supply actions The use of natural gas will be encouraged and the commercialization of high efficiency gas technologies will be accelerated. Federal agencies will form a renewable technology consortium with utilities in order to commercialize windpower, photovoltaics, biomass and geothermal energy. Special attention is paid to a utility industry strategy. The Department of Energy will enter into partnerships with utilities who voluntarily commit to (1) return GHG emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000 or (2) limit emissions under strict performance measures. Letters of intent for alternative 1 (return GHG emissions to 1990 levels) have been received from 7 utilities. Another 50 utilities have signed a letter of intent for alternative 2. These energy utilities will also be allowed to achieve their targets within the context of international cooperation by joint implementation. The plan further specifies similar measures for methane and other GHG's. For forestry, the plan announces assistance to private landowners who intend to protect forest. Another measure includes the promotion of paper recycling programmes. The president and vice president have announced that a White House task force will monitor and evaluate the Climate Change Action Plan. When necessary, this committee will propose additional policies. It is not easy, at this point to assess the American position. Most of the policy measures announced in the Clinton Gore plan do not refer to concrete interventions, like the German programme does. One may even argue that, since the new administration came into power, the American climate policy has not exceeded the noncommittal character of the policy under the Bush administration or, for Europe, the UK-approach. Indeed, there is reason to believe that under the new administration, US climate policy has changed its rhetoric but not its substance. Rayner concludes that environmental conflict in the US "reflects a profound conflict within American culture and political life that the ambiguous rhetoric of 'sustainable development' may temporarily conceal but has yet to transcend" (Rayner, 1993: 9). He, therefore, expects that the Clinton-Gore administration will not be able to overcome all institutional and cultural barriers. But this conclusion may appear unwarranted because: * the new administration has formulated quite stringent targets; * the change in rhetoric may be the most visible act of the new administration so far. Symbolic policy may well be crucial in creating broad societal support for new goals in order to handle a newly recognized policy problem. It cannot yet be stated with certainty how US-policies will develop; * on first sight US-policy shows a remarkable similarity with UK-policies. But there is at least one subtle, however major difference between the two. Till now, UK policy has been based on the notion that every sector, firm or individual has a responsibility of its own. Public policy keeps distance from private responsibility. US- policies, as they have been formulated recently, address the notion of a common responsibility, since it recognizes that only a common effort will be effective. It would be far from reality to conclude that the US is now taking the lead in the international endeavour to handle the climate problem. An important step has been made by the Clinton/Gore administration, but the effectiveness of the new approach in achieving the national target cannot yet be assessed. 7. Conclusions The various reports and programmes reveal that at this moment all countries under scrutiny in this report have set certain targets for CO2 and other GHG emissions. All have recently come up with a detailed programme, except the United Kingdom (that will present its programme by the end of this year). Since all countries are still in the process of making political choices, their plans so far do not reflect an end- stage of their decision processes. Besides, many plans show some ambiguity. Nevertheless, it is now possible to draw some conclusions about the Netherlands' activities in the international context. The first conclusion addresses the widespread idea that the Netherlands is more active in this field than others. This is only partly true. The report from the Netherlands government to the European Community (April, 1992) contains indeed two experiences that may be of interest for other countries. The first relates to the activities based upon the Environmental Action Plans (MAPs) of the energy utility companies and the initiatives in the field of combined heat and power. Of particular interest is the margin on consumer prices (MAP- heffing). This margin, combined with the investment fund for subsidizing the purchase of energy-efficient appliances, may be of interest for other countries as well. It is in line with initiatives taken in the US and Japan. Secondly, the instrument of long-term agreements among government and sectors of industry is typical for the Dutch experience. These agreements are more or less binding, since they force each firm to work out an action plan that becomes part of its environmental permits. The Netherlands, however, can also learn form other countries. The German programme, in particular, contains several actions that have not yet been taken or even considered in the Netherlands. Interesting are the differential electricity price, the green label and the incentives for architects and construction engineers. It would also be advisable for Dutch environmental policy to learn from experiences outside the EC. Much happens in Japan and the US that may contribute to new initiatives here. The second conclusion addresses the chances and opportunities for international progress. Until the Rio Conference, the EC was acting as a leading force. However, even at that time there were differences among the EC countries: the UK, taking a modest position, and countries like Germany, Denmark and the Netherlands, taking a more radical stand. At that time, this did not cause stagnation. However, by now, the internal conflict combined with economic recession, has delayed the EC decision-making process. The European Commission has neither the power nor the authority to implement a coherent programme. The US and Japan, on the other hand, are making progress. Still, it is doubtful whether one of these countries will take the lead. Thus, there may not be one single party in the international arena that is able and willing to speed up the process. On the contrary, we may expect that, for the near future technical discussions on how to measure emission limitations (see Section 2 on the EC) may dominate the international agenda. However, it would also be a mistake to conclude that no significant actions are taken at all. In the countries under investigation, a great deal of work is being done. It appears most likely that international progres will be made step by step, in an incremental way. The international process is likely to be incremental, as two contradictory tendencies can clearly be observed in the international policy arena. On the one hand, there is the tendency to wait for others to take the initiative. There is some justification for such a "free rider" behaviour as for each nation the 'rational' way to act is to do nothing[8]. The other tendency, however, is to act because of awareness of the environmental risks and its economic and technological opportunities. The conclusion, that contradictory tendencies are at work on the national and international scenes, raises a new question: how can the Netherlands contribute to international action, more than by means of dissemination of its successful experiences? 8. Discussion and recommendations The opportunities for a Dutch contribution to speed up the international process are modest. In this section, I, nevertheless, will argue that the Netherlands have some experience which could turn out to be a contribution. Those who argue for a proactive climate policy usually put their faith in science. They expect that, as the scientists come up with more and unambiguous proof, the international community will accept drastic policies. This expectation is based on the tacit assumption that the climate problem is primarily a scientific problem. This assumption may be accompanied by the assumption that the ability of solving this problem is, to a large extent, the domain of scientific experts. It is not hard to see that there is something wrong with this argument. It is well known that scientific information may be crucial for the success or failure of a public policy, but it never is the only decisive factor. Scientific findings are used to form or justify policies and are, therefore, often modified. Interest groups or governments, resisting international climate policies, have pointed to the uncertainties and ambiguities that are present in statistics and other material on climate change. There is all reason to believe they will continue to do so, Therefore, scientific knowledge is an indispensible but insufficient condition to promote political action. Beside science, the political will is the decisive element in the making of decisions that address the climate problem. The political will is not only based on facts but on values also. The values relevant for climate policy include ethical considerations concerning the rights of future generations, an equittable distribution of eco-space and the relations between the wealthy and the poor[9]. Societal support for climate policies may increase as these policies explicitly articulate ethical considerations. This is not a matter of clever promotion. It is doubtful whether political will and public awarenes can be influenced either by abstract formula, like 'greenhouse effect', or by fear for the dramatic impacts of climate change. Political action may be furthered by encouraging political discussion. One way of doing this is by addressing the practical implications of scientific findings for all policy fields. By confronting the political community with the consequences of policies in distinct areas for the environment, fragmented public policies may become more integrated. An instrument the political comunity may use is a kind of 'sustainability-test' (duurzaamheidstoets). A pilot test has been developed by the Association of Dutch local governments (VNG) and is explored and considered by some local and provincial government. The basic idea is to review the impact of a certain policy on the environment. This test can be applied to measures in all policy fields, like the economy, physical planning, housing, transportation, employment, and emancipation. Its purpose is to further political discussion on sustainable development in different areas of public policy. The idea of reviewing the environmental consequences of policies in various fields is also present in the German and in the American action plans. It is recommended to investigate in what way this instrument for political decision-making can be succesfully employed. Since political action to address the climate problem is increasingly dependant on societal support, it is also recommended to extend the dialogue between science, policy actors and politics to the general public. Political interaction and discussion may prove to be an efficient means for raising awareness of the problem and the political will to implement practical solutions (Hisschemšller, 1993). The opportunities for a societal dialogue may be seriously explored. A societal dialogue on the climate issue may bring about societal support for policy-alternatives that decision- makers not consider at the moment, either because the alternatives are expected to meet with huge resistance, either because they are new and unknown by now. Since climate change is a global problem, a societal dialogue might not be limited to one single country, but extended to the international community. It is recommended to investigate the conditions and opportunities for such initiatives. 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Prospects for CO2 emissions reduction policy in the USA. In: Steve Rayner (editor), National casestudies of institutional capabilities to implement greenhouse gas reductions, Special issue of Global Environmental Change: human and policy dimensions, Vol. 3, No. 1: 12-31, March 1993. White House (1993). Clinton unveals plan to curb greenhouse gas emissions, Overview and key elements of the plan. 10-19- 1993. Wynne, Brian (1993). Implementation of greenhouse gas reductions in the European Community. In: Steve Rayner (ed.), National case studies of institutional capabilities to implement greenhouse gas reductions, Special issue of Global Environmental Change: human and policy dimensions, Vol. 3, No. 1: 101-128, March 1993. Footnotes 0 Note that the data presented in Table 2 are drawn from the working paper. These data themselves need not necessarily be adequate. 1 See, for example, the so-called Government White Paper, entitled The Common Inheri-tance: Britain's environmental strategy (London, 1990). 2 Like France and Japan, the UK has chosen to shift from coal to nu-clear in the power generation sector. However, the nuclear energy sector is not doing well. Paradoxically, the sector's future may become highly uncertain if the Conservative government acts according to its major political objective and, after the coal sector, privatises the nuclear sector too. 3 Namely the measures 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27. 4 Namely the measures 5, 6, 12, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 21, 24, 28 and 29 5 Namely the measures 21, 24, 25 and 27. 6 In relation to this point, the political and economic developments in Russia are of importance. 7 From this, it cannot be simply derived that the United States is behind Europe in all aspects of climate-related policy. Due to the adoption of various efficiency standards and the involvement of the utility in energy efficiency, energy end-use patterns in the US have been rather constant for more than fifteen years now. For example, the USA used about the same amount of primary energy in 1987 as in 1974, while the economy during this period grew by 39% in real terms (Rayner, 1993: 13). In Europe and elsewhere, energy consumption in the transportation sector is still rising, in spite of government policies to discourage private car use and promote public transportation. 8 In this phrase I refer to theories of 'rational choice', Mancur Olson's Logic of collective action (1971) in particular. Olson and other theorists argue that, since there is no guarantee that others will act the same way, investments in the environment by just one or a few actors will not be perceptible. In these theories, the concept of 'rationality' refers to economic rationality only: calculating costs and benefits. This may be the pervasive meaning of 'rationality'; it is, nevertheless, incomplete, because it only refers to the adding of means to goals and not to the choice and justification of goals for action. 9 See the line of argument in Gore (1992).